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Dag Hammarsk6i1d and U Thant:
The Evolution of Their Office*
M. G. Kaladharan Nagar
Introduction
'"(T HE UNITED NATIONS is but a reflection of the interna-
,tional community, and in effect its success or failure is the
success or failure of the international community." This has been
one of the recurring themes in
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member states themselves." I
the various public statements and
speeches' of U Thant in his ca-
pacity as the Secretary-General
of the United Nations. On the
other hand, his predecessor Dag
Hammarskj6ld in his Copenha-
gen speech" of May 2, 1959,
pictured the United Nations as
having "an existence and pos-
sibilities of action independent
of the will of the member gov-
ernments and the policy of the
[e spoke of the United Nations'
"whole" as in certain respects "more than the sum of its parts." He
asserted that the Organization had increasingly developed "an inde-
pendent position," rooted in "the existence of an opinion indepen-
dent of partisan interests and dominated by the objectives indicated
in the United Nations Charter." Arising from these two statements
of the two Secretaries-General, one may ask the crucial question: is
the United Nations, as an international organization, merely the in-
strument of national foreign policies or does it influence world pol-
itics in its own right? An important explanatory key to this ques-
* The author is indebted to Professor Frank C. Newman, School of Law, University
of California, Berkeley for his encouragement and guidance in the research for this
article.
' U Thant, People Are Asking "Why?" - An address delivered to the Council on
Foreign Relations in Chicago on May 5, 1971, in UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE, June,
1971, at 82-83. See also U Thant's Press Conference in Dakar, Senegal, on Jan. 4, 1970,
in UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Feb., 1970, at 35; U Thant's Press Conference at Accra,
Ghana on Jan. 9, 1970, in UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Feb., 1970, at 42-43.
2 Dag Hammarskj6ld, Do We Need the United Nations? - An Affirmative An-
swer, An address before the Students Association, Copenhagen, Denmark, May 2, 1959,
in UNITED NATIONS REVIEW, June, 1959, at 24-25.
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tion is the executive head of the Organization - the Secretary-Gen-
eral himself, the focal point of this inquiry.
The question posed above has both ontological and systemic im-
plications. The ontological implication is whether the United Na-
tions has an existence and an essence of its own, i.e., a life of its own.
The systemic implication concerns how an international system based
upon nation-states may become transformed in the direction of
greater integration, from being a forum of multilateral diplomacy
into something which is more than the sum of its inputs, capable of
bringing anarchic interstate relations under a common regulatory
power. The hypothesis is that the political role of the executive
head of the Organization is especially important in the process of
such a transformation.
Thus, it is the purpose of this article: (1) to set forth the devel-
oping political role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations;
(2) to consider the factors influencing such development; (3) to
explain the impact of his enlarged political role on the United Na-
tions; and (4) to indicate its implications for the development of
international law. It is proposed to consider the legacy left by Dag
Hammarskjbld, and U Thant's role in building on the Office he in-
herited from Hammarskj6ld.'
The importance of the Secretariat is emphasised by the fact that
it is listed in Article 7 of the Charter as one of the "principal or-
gans" of the United Nations, thus placing it, in this respect, in a po-
sition of equality with the General Assembly, the three Councils and
the International Court of Justice rather than in a position of de-
pendence or subservience. The acquisition of such status entails sig-
nificant consequences, for it is the principal organs which are pri-
marily responsible for the attainment of the objectives of the United
Nations and for the observance of the principles of the Charter.
The Secretary-General, thus, appears as one of the organizational
elements shouldering and sharing the responsibility for the constitu-
tional behavior of Member States.4
The Preparatory Commission of the United Nations emphasised
the "key position of the Secretariat in the United Nations." 5  The
Report of the Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee to
3 It is not proposed to consider the present Secretary-General's role in this respect
at this stage.
4 Cf. Alexandrowicz, The Secretary-General of the United Nations, 11 INT'L & COM-
PARATIVE L. Q. 1112 (1962).
5 Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, PC/20, Dec. 23,
1945, at 84.
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the General Assembly indicates that it was guided by this consider-
ation: "to enable a man of eminence and high attainment to accept
and maintain the position" of the Secretary-General. 6 The Prepara-
tory Commission recognized that "his choice of staff - more par-
ticularly of higher staff - and his leadership will largely determine
the character and efficiency of the Secretariat as a whole,"' and that
"the degree in which the objects of the Charter can be realized will
be largely determined by the manner in which the Secretariat per-
forms its task."8
In addition to the constitutional status of being one of the "prin-
cipal organs," there are explicit provisions in the Charter to guaran-
tee the independence of the Secretary-General and his staff. Article
100, paragraph 1, provides:
In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the
staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or
from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall
refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as
international officials responsible only to the Organization.
In Article 97 the Secretary-General is described as the "chief admin-
istrative officer of the Organization," making it a basic Charter re-
quirement, rather than a matter left to the discretion of the other
organs, that the administration of the Organization shall be left to
the Secretary-General. Article 97 is of fundamental importance for
the status of the Secretariat. Together with Articles 100 and i01,"
it creates for the Secretariat a position, administratively, of full po-
litical independence.
The principle of the independence of the Secretariat from na-
tional pressures has also been reinforced in the Charter by Article
6 Report of the Fifth Committee to the General Assembly, A/I1, Jan. 23, 1946, at 1.
The Preparatory Commission had also recommended that "the terms of the appoint-
ment of the Secretary-General should be such as to enable a man of eminence and high
attainment to accept and maintain the position." Report of the Preparatory Commission,
PC/20, Dec. 23, 1945, at 81.
T See Report, supra note 5, at 86.
8 Id. at 81; see also id. at 85.
9 Article 101 of the UN Charter reads:
1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations estab-
lished by the General Assembly.
2. Appropriate staffs shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social
Council, the Trusteeship Council, and, as required, to other organs of the United Na-
tions. These staffs shall form a part of the Secretariat.
3. The paramount consideration in the emp!oyment of the staff and in the deter-
minination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest stan-
dards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the impor-
tance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.
[Vol. 7: 36
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105, which provides for granting officials of the Organization "such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exer-
cise of their functions in connection with the Organization."' 0
Closely connected with the independent status of the UN Secre-
tariat is its "exclusively international character." Article 100, para-
graph 2, of the Charter provides:
Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the ex-
clusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secre-
tary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the
discharge of their responsibilities. 1'
The Preparatory Commission observed that:
If it is to enjoy the confidence of all the Members of the United
Nations, the Secretariat must be truly international in character....
Such a Secretariat cannot be composed, even in part, of national
representatives responsible to Governments. For the duration of
their appointments, the Secretary-General and the staff will not be
the servants of the state of which they are nationals, but the servants
only of the United Nations....
Loyalty to the Organization is in no way incompatible with an
official's attachment to his own country, whose higher interest he is
serving in serving the United Nations. It clearly involves, however,
a broad international outlook and a detachment from national preju-
dices and narrow national interests. 12
Article 100 of the Charter is supplemented by Regulation 1.1 of
10 It was in fact foreseen at San Francisco that in exceptional circumstances there
might be a clash between the independent position of a member of the Secretariat and
the position of his country, and consequently that an immunity in respect of official acts
would be necessary for the protection of the officials from pressure by individual govern-
ments and to permit them to carry out their international responsibilities without inter-
ference. 7 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 394.
Cf. Dag Hammarskj6ld, The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact, A lec-
ture delivered to congregation on May 30, 1961, at Oxford University, at 9.
11 The Covenant of the League of Nations was silent on the international character
of the Secretariat. It contained no provisions comparable to those of Article 100 of the
UN Charter, but simply stated:
"The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the seat of the League. The
Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such secretaries and staff as
may be required" (Article VI of the Covenant of the League of Nations).
However, Article 1 of the Staff Regulations of the Secretariat of the League of Na-
tions enjoined all officials "to discharge their functions and to regulate their conduct with
the interests of the League alone in view" and prohibited them from seeking or receiving
"instructions from any Government or other authority external to the Secretariat of the
League of Nations." Article 100 of the UN Charter closely resembles those League
regulations.
12 Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, PC/20, December
23, 1945, at 85.
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the Staff Regulations1" and by the oath14 taken by staff members up-
on appointment. Regulation 1.1 of the Staff Regulations reads:
Members of the Secretariat are international civil servants. Their
responsibilities are not national but exclusively international. By
accepting appointment, they pledge themselves to discharge their
functions and to regulate their conduct with the interests of the
United Nations alone in view.
The international character of the Secretariat is not synonymous
with its multinational composition. The wide distribution of na-
tionalities within the Secretariat may contribute to its international
character, but it does not become international simply because it is
composed of a wide range of nationalities. Its international char-
acter largely depends on its positive commitment to the Purposes
and Principles which govern the United Nations.1 1 Thus, Dag
Hammarskj6ld rightly insisted:
The exclusively international character of the Secretariat is not tied
to its composition, but to the spirit in which it works and to its
insulation from outside influences as stated in Article 100.16
The Secretariat is international in the way in which it fulfils
its functions, not because of its geographic composition but because
of the attitudes of the members of the Secretariat and the truly
international spirit in which they fulfil their tasks - if that had
not been the view, the Charter would certainly have made wide geo-
graphic representation a primary consideration, instead of subordi-
nating it to a demand for integrity.17
The Secretariat comprises the Secretary-General and "such staff
13 U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/Staff Rules.
14 Members of the Secretariat are required to subscribe to the following oath or dec-
laration:
"I solemnly swear (undertake, affirm, promise) to exercise in all loyalty, discre-
tion and conscience the functions entrusted to me as an international civil ser-
vant of the United Nations, to discharge these functions and regulate my con-
duct with the interests of the United Nations only in view, and not to seek or
accept instructions in regard to the performance of my duties from any govern-
ment or other authority external to the Organization" (Regulation 1.9 of the
Staff Regulations).
15 See Winchmore, The Secretariat: Retrospect and Prospect, 19 INT'L ORGANIZA-
TION 626 (1965):
"The Secretariat must remain international in the sense in which science is
international - not by reason of the diffusion of scientists among the many
nationalities of the world but by reason of their commitment to purposes of
universal validity."
16 Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization (16 June 1960-15 June 1961), 16 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 1A, at 6, U.N.
Doc. A/4800/Add. 1.
1 7 Art. 101 (3); see also 15 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 50, 10, U.N.
Doc. A/C.5/843 (21 November 1960).
[Vol. 7: 36
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as the Organization may require." '18 The word "Secretariat" and the
phrase "such staff as the Organization may require" suggest an inte-
grated group. This impression is confirmed by the further stipula-
tion in Article 97 of the Charter that the Secretary-General is the
chief administrative officer.1"
With regard to the Secretariat's structure, two different views
were advanced in the Preparatory Commission: (1) that the Secre-
tariat should be organized as a single working body with each depart-
ment serving each organ within the limits of its particular responsi-
bilities; and (2) that each organ should have its own separate secre-
tariat. The Commission favored a unified Secretariat and accepted
the first view, for the following reasons: (1) all organs have their
responsibilities in the primary common task of maintaining interna-
tional peace and security; (2) duplication of work, overlapping, and
confusion would be avoided; and (3) the second alternative would
give rise to divided loyalties and undesirable rivalry.2°
The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly up-
on the recommendation of the Security Council,2 and the members
of the staff are appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations
established by the General Assembly.22 The power of the Secretary-
General to appoint staff members is unqualified. A proposal made
at San Francisco that deputy secretaries-general be appointed in the
same manner as the Secretary-General was rejected on the grounds
that this would weaken the authority of the Secretary-General, de-
tract from the efficiency of the Secretariat, and lead to the political
domination of the Secretariat by the great powers.23
Regulation 1.2 of the Staff Regulations provides that the staff
members are subject to the authority of the Secretary-General and re-
sponsible to him in the exercise of their functions. Further, the
Preparatory Commission laid emphasis on the fact that the Secretary-
General "alone is responsible to the other principal organs for the
Secretariat's work," and that "all officials of the United Nations must
18 Article 97 of the UN Charter.
19 Cf. GOODRICH, HAMBRO & SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 580
(3rd ed. 1969).
20 Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, PC/20, December
23, 1945, at 88.
21 Article 97 of the UN Charter.
2 2 Article 101(1) of the UN Charter.
23 R. RUSSEL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 854-60 (1958);
GOODRICH, HAMBRO & SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, at 601.
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recognize the exclusive authority of the Secretary-General" and sub-
mit themselves to rules of discipline laid down by him.24
It is thus appropriate to regard the Secretary-General as embody-
ing, in his person, the whole of the Secretariat. Justifiably, there-
fore, the Secretary-General has been referred to as a principal organ
in the meaning of Article 7 of the Charter (although Article 7 re-
fers to the Secretariat and not to the Secretary-General). 25 Indeed,
Dag Hammarskj6ld even went to the extent of describing his Office
as a "one-man executive.'"'2 He fought the troika scheme 21 to main-
tain the integrity of his Office.
The Secretary-General is designated "the chief administrative of-
ficer," not merely of the Secretariat but of the Organization.28 In
the words of Hammarskj6ld, "he is the only elected officer in prin-
ciple representing all members.' '21 In his view, "the rules of election
aim at ensuring that the Secretary-General, as one of the main or-
gans of the United Nations, shall have the opportunity of function-
ing as the spokesman of the Organization in its capacity as an inde-
pendent opinion factor.' °
The Preparatory Commission had also held the view that:
the Secretary-General, more than any one else, will stand for the
United Nations as a whole. In the eyes of the world, no less than
24 Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, PC/20, December
23, 1945, at 85 (para. 5), and at 86 (para. 15).
Cf. Dag Hammarskj6ld, The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact (Oxford
University lecture, May 30, 1961), at 8.
25 Alexandrowicz, The Secretary-General of the United Nations, 11 INT'L & COM-
PARATIVE L. Q. 1112 (1962).
26 Dag Hammarskj6ld, The Development of a Constitutional Framework for Inter-
national Cooperation (Address at Chicago University Law School, May 1, 1960), in
UNITED NATIONS REVIEW, June, 1960, at 28.
27 The Soviet proposal in 1960 that the Office of the Secretary-General be abolished,
and replaced by a "collective executive body" of three persons, representing the Western
powers, the Socialist States, and the neutralist countries. See U.N. GAOR, 15th Session,
869th, 882nd, and 904th Plenary Meetings, 23 Sept., 3 Oct., and 13 Oct., 1960, re-
spectively.
28 Article 97 of the UN Charter.
29 Dag Hammarskj61d, The Development of a Constitutional Framework for Inter-
national Cooperation (Address at Chicago University Law School, May 1, 1960), in
UNITED NATIONS REVIEW, June, 1960, at 29.
30 Dag Hammarskj6ld, Do We Need the United Nations? - An Affirmative An-
swer (Copenhagen speech, May 2, 1959), in UNITED NATIONS REVIEW, June, 1959,
at 25.
Hammarskj6ld asserted: "The Secretary-General is elected by the General Assembly,
but on the recommendation of the Security Council, and this recommendation requires
unanimity among the five permanent Council members. The purpose of this arrange-
ment is to ensure that the Secretary-General shall, as far as possible, be placed outside
or lifted above conflicts which may split the Assembly or the Council."
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in the eyes of his own staff, he must embody the principles and
ideals of the Charter to which the Organization seeks to give ef-
fect.3 '
)While Article 97 of the Charter emphasizes the role of the Sec-
retary-General as the chief administrative officer, Articles 98 and 99
give him a role that goes beyond the concept of a non-political civil
servant. This unique feature of the Secretary-General's position was
given expression to by Hammarskjbld thus:
. . . Article 98 entitled the General Assembly and the Security
Council to entrust the Secretary-General with tasks going beyond the
verba formalia of Article 97 - with its emphasis on the administra-
tive functions - thus opening the door to a measure of political
responsibility which is distinct from the authority explicitly accorded
to the Secretary-General under Article 99 but in keeping with the
spirit of that Article.
This . . . development concerning the Secretary-General, with
its obvious consequences for the Secretariat as such, takes us beyond
the concept of a non-political civil service into an area where the
official, in the exercise of his functions, may be forced to take stands
of a politically controversial nature. It does this, however, on an
international basis and, thus, without departing from the basic con-
cept of "neutrality"; in fact, Article 98, as well as Article 99,
would be unthinkable without the complement of Article 100 strict-
ly observed both in letter and spirit.3 2
THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
Article 98 is the first of two articles setting out the political re-
sponsibilities of the Secretary-General. This is a radical departure
from the non-political concept of the Secretary-Generalship to be
found in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 98, by
providing that the General Assembly and the three Councils may
entrust the Secretary-General with unspecified "other functions," has
brought him (and the Secretariat) into the arena of political con-
flict. This Article provides for the Secretary-General's being en-
trusted with responsibilities involving the exercise of considerable
discretion and political judgment. The range of functions with
which the Secretary-General has been or may be entrusted by the
General Assembly and the Councils is limited only by the functions
31 Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, PC/20, December
23, 1945, at 87.
See also Hammarskj6ld's statement in the Security Council on October 31, 1956:
"(The Secretary-General must) be a servant of the principles of the Charter, and its aims
must ultimately determine what.for him is right and wrong." 11 U.N. SCOR, 751st
Meeting, October 31, 1956, at 2.
32 Dag Hammarskj6ld, The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact (Oxford
University lecture, May 30, 1961), at 13-14.
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and powers of these organs. The General Assembly, in its second
session, adopted a resolution in which it drew the attention of the
Councils and their Commissions, as well as the Commissions ap-
pointed by the General Assembly, to the desirability of utilizing to
the utmost the services of the Secretariat. 3 It also recommended
"specifically to the respective organs of the United Nations to con-
sider carefully, before the creation of special commissions and sub-
committees, whether the task to be carried out could not usefully be
entrusted to the Secretariat." 4
Practically, the extent to which functions are entrusted to the
Secretary-General depends on the willingness of governments to al-
low decisions to pass from their immediate control, the confidence
the particular occupant of the Office inspires, and the advantages
which member governments see in having functions performed and
decisions taken by a knowledgeable, experienced, and objective in-
ternational official and his staff.
The assignment of functions to the Secretary-General inevitably
involves vesting in him some discretion with regard to the carrying
out of his task. The extent of this discretion varies with the nature
and circumstances of the assignment. It may be of considerable im-
portance and political significance in the case of tasks in the peace
and security field. There were a number of such cases 5 involving
controversial situations where the Secretary-General was confronted
with mandates of a highly general character, expressing the bare
minimum of agreement attainable within the representative organs.
The execution of those tasks involved the exercise of political judg-
ment by the Secretary-General.
The Secretary-General may find himself in the position where
the directives provided by resolutions of the Security Council or the
General Assembly do not cover a new situation or are unclear in
their application to it, while at the same time the organ or organs that
have assigned functions to him are unable to define or clarify their
assignment. The Congo experience provided striking examples of
such situations.36 The Secretary-General's initial assignment from
the Security Council had been:
33 G.A. Res. 183(11), October 20, 1947, U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess., Resolutions, at
153.
341d.; Cf. GOODRICH, HAMBRO & SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
at 586.
35 For an illustrative list of such cases, see Dag Hammarskj6ld, The International
Civil Servant in Law and in Fact (Oxford University lecture, May 30, 1961), at 20-22.
36 For a factual review of the Congo experience, see YEARBOOK U.N. 1960, at 52-
[VOL. 7: 36
HAMMARSKJOLD AND THANT
to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Republic of
the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance
as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese
Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations,
the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Gov-
ernment, to meet fully their tasks.37
Disagreement arose over the Secretary-General's interpretation of
his powers with respect to the introduction of United Nations forces
into Katanga, the role of these forces in the civil war, and the extent
to which support might be given to one or the other claimant to legit-
imate authority.3 8 Hammarskj6ld took the position that, in a situa-
tion where the authorizing organs were unable to clarify their direc-
tives, he was faced with the alternatives of refusing to proceed with
his mission, which would mean chaos, or of undertaking to carry out
his assignment on the basis of his international responsibility even
though he had to deal with controversial issues. In following the
latter course, he sought guidance in the purposes and principles of
the Charter, the body of legal doctrine and precepts accepted by
states generally, and the opinions of member states as expressed
through their permanent representatives and through advisory com-
mittees.39
It is Article 99 of the Charter which gives the Secretary-General
explicit political responsibility in his own right. This Article pro-
vides:
The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security
Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the mainte-
nance of international peace and security.
The political role of the Secretary-General under Article 99 was
expressly recognized by the Preparatory Commission. The Com-
mission stated:
The Secretary-General may have an important role to play as a medi-
ator and as an informal adviser of many governments, and will un-
doubtedly be called upon from time to time, in the exercise of his
administrative duties, to take decisions which may justly be called
political. Under Article 99 of the Charter, moreover, he has been
given a quite special right which goes beyond any power previous-
ly accorded to the head of an international organization, 40 viz.: to
37 U.N. Doc. S/4387, July 13, 1960.
38 The U.S.S.R. challenged the Secretary-General's authority to act as he did, pro-
posed a draft resolution envisaging the dismissal of Hammarskj6ld, subjected him to boy-
cott, and proposed that his office be reorganized according to the "troika" principle. See
note 27 supra.
39 See Hammarskjbld, supra note 32, at 21-26.
40 It has been observed: "This description is perhaps slightly exaggerated as it fails
19741
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bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter (not mere-
ly any dispute or situation) which, in his opinion, may threaten the
maintenance of international peace and security. It is impossible to
foresee how this Article will be applied; but the responsibility it
confers upon the Secretary-General will require the exercise of the
highest qualities of political judgment, tact and integrity.41
This statement of the Preparatory Commission was transmitted by
the General Assembly to the Secretary-General for his guidance.42
The Security Council has also expressly recognized the political role
played by the Secretary-General. At the 1329th meeting on Decem-
ber 2, 1966, in a statement made by the President on behalf of the
Council, it was recorded that the members of the Council "fully re-
spect [the Secretary-General's] position and his action in bringing
basic issues confronting the Organization and disturbing develop-
ments in many parts of the world to their notice .
The Secretary-General's power under Article 99 is equivalent to
that of a member state under Article 35, or to that of the General
Assembly under Article 11(3). Significantly, however, the Secre-
tary-General's prerogative under Article 99 extends to "any matter"
and not just any "dispute" or "situation."
The initial acceptance of Article 99 at the Dumbarton Oaks Con-
ference appears to have reflected a feeling that the League system
suffered from the fact that only a member state could bring an al-
leged "threat to the peace" to the Council's attention.44 Article 99
enables the Secretary-General to start the whole United Nations
machinery moving on the basis of his own judgment regarding what
is a threat to peace and security.
According to Article 99, the Secretary-General may bring to the
attention of the Security Council any matter which, in his opinion,
may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.
to take account of resolutions of the First and Second Assemblies of the League of Nations
which entrusted the League Secretary-General with powers of a nature remarkably similar
to those with which the United Nations Secretary-General is invested by Article 99. But
the words of the Preparatory Commission aptly emphasise that, with respect to the ex-
press constitutional position of the Secretary-General of the international political orga-
nization, Article 99 represents a departure of consequence." Schwebel, The Origins and
Development of Article 99 of the Charter, 28 THE BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 371-72 (1951); see also S. SCHWEBEL, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: HIS POLITICAL POWERS AND PRACTICE 231 (1952).
41 Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, PC/20, December
23, 1945, at 86-87.
42 General Assembly Resolution 13(I), February 13, 1946.
43 U.N. SCOR, 1329th meeting, December 2, 1966, at 1.
44 R. RUSSEL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER at 432. See also
note 40 supra.
[Vol. 7 : 36
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Thus, the Secretary-General has double discretion. First, it is for
him to decide whether, in his opinion, the matter would be eligible to
be put on the agenda of the Council. Second, even if he comes to
the conclusion that this is the case, he need not necessarily submit
the matter to the Council. He may do so, but Article 99 makes it
clear that there is no affirmative duty on him to go this far. It is
still for him to decide whether he will formally invoke that Article,
or take other or even no action. As to whether the exercise of the
power should be made obligatory or optional was considered at the
San Francisco Conference and it was decided that the right "should
be exercised at the discretion of the Secretary-General and should not
be imposed upon him as a duty."'4 , As will be seen later, the discre-
tionary nature of Article 99 has far-reaching consequences.
The question whether the application of Article 99 should ex-
tend to the General Assembly or be restricted to the Security Coun-
cil was also considered at the San Francisco Conference. On this
point it was argued that applying the provision explicitly to the Gen-
eral Assembly would violate the principle of the primary responsi-
bility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international
peace and security as called for by Article 24. Some delegates "dis-
cussed the difficulty in which the Secretary-General might be placed
in having to decide between the General Assembly and the Security
Council in presenting matters concerning peace and security.'"
Although the power under Article 99 is limited to the Security
Council, the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and the
other Councils empower the Secretary-General to bring matters to
their attention.47 The Secretary-General has used this right repeat-
edly in order to exercise influence over the work of these organs.48
Further, the provision of Article 98 that "the Secretary-General
shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work
of the Organization" puts at the disposal of the Secretary-General
another medium of bringing matters threatening international peace
and security to the attention of the General Assembly. The Secre-
tary-General has, in the past, used his annual report to the General
Assembly to discuss controversial issues and to give his views on the
45 7 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 392. Cf. GOODRICH, HAMBRO & SIMONS, CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS at 589.
46 7 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 392. Cf. GOODRICH, HAMBRO & SIMONS, CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS, 589; S. Schwebel, The Origins and Development of Article
99 of the Charter, 28 THE BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 375 (1951).
47 G.A. Rule 13; T.C. Rule 9; ECOSOC Rule 10.
48 Cf. GOODRICH, HAMBRO & SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 576.
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state of international affairs along with specific suggestions as to
what the Organization and its members can do to promote its pur-
poses.49
Another point that was considered at the San Francisco Confer-
ence related to whether, in addition to matters threatening interna-
tional peace and security, the Secretary-General should be empowered
to draw the Organization's attention to "any matters which consti-
tute an infringement or violation of the principles of the Charter."5
Such a proposal was not agreed to.'
However, Lauterpacht has drawn attention to the "considerable
potentialities" which Article 99 presents for bringing before the
Security Council violations of human rights so grave that they
threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. 52  He
has further observed:
The clause of domestic jurisdiction of Article 2, paragraph 7, pre-
sents no impediment in the way of the exercise of this particular
function of the Secretary-General. The matters referred to in Ar-
ticle 99 are not, by definition, essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of any state. 53
As already noted, 54 the matters referred to in Article 99 are mat-
ters of the Secretary-General's discretion. The determination of
what is a threat to international peace and security is one susceptible
of considerable variance in judgment. The Secretary-General's discre-
tion is even broader in that he may raise matters which not only
threaten, but those which "may threaten" international peace and se-
curity.
Under the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Coun-
cil, the President must call a meeting of the Council "if the Secre-
49 The annual reports contain, apart from the detailed report, an introduction in
which the Secretary-General gives his views on achievements of the past year, the state
of international affairs, and what the UN and its members can do to promote its pur-
poses.
The General Assembly Rules of Procedure provide that the Secretary-General shall
not only make an annual report, but also "such supplementary reports as are required"
(Rule 48).
50 7 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 162-163, (392) (Committee 1/2, 17th meeting); Cf. S. Schwe-
bel, The Origins and Development of Article 99 of the Charter, 28 The British Year-
book of International Law, 375 (1951).
51 7 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 168-169 (Committee 1/2, 18th meeting); see also id. at
392-93.
5 2
H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 187 (1950).
53 ld.
5 4 See p. 4 7.
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tary-General brings to the attention of the Security Council any mat-
ter under Article 99.'"
However, the Security Council remains the master of its working
agenda.5" The Secretary-General may do no more than place the
matter on the Council's provisional agenda and argue, if need be,
for the Council's adoption of the item for its working agenda.57
Since the Secretary-General's raising of a matter before the Security
Council is rooted in an explicit Charter authorization to which the
Security Council must pay due respect, it seems highly improbable
that the Council would refuse to take up an item submitted by the
Secretary-General under Article 99.8
An initiative taken by the Secretary-General under Article 99 is
to be distinguished from a request that he be allowed to make a state-
ment in the Security Council. For instance, the Laotian crisis was
brought to the Council's attention in the form of a report from the
Secretary-General without invoking Article 99."0 In that connec-
tion, Hammarskjdld explained the distinction as follows:
. ..I have based my action on a practice which has developed over
the years in the Security Council. According to this practice, the
Secretary-General, when he requests it, is granted the floor in the
Council in order to make such statements on subjects within the
range of the responsibility of the Council as he considers called for
under the terms of his own responsibilities. 60 Just as the Secretary-
General can ask for, and is granted the floor in the Council, I feel
that he is entitled to request an opportunity to address the Council
publicly on a matter which he considers necessary personally to put
before the Council. In doing so within the framework to which I
have just referred, the Secretary-General does not introduce formally
on the agenda of the Council anything beyond his own wish to re-
port to the Council. Naturally, the Council retains the same rights
in relation to such initiative of the Secretary-General as it has re-
garding any request of his to address the Council.
What I said should be enough to clarify the constitutional situ-
ation when, in this case, I have asked for an opportunity to report
to the Council. It should, thus, be clear that the request is not
5 Security Council, Provisional Rules of Procedure, Doc. S/96/Rev. 5, Rule 3.
56 Id. Rule 9.
57 Id. Rules 6 and 22.
58 Hammarskj6ld held the view that the Security Council would be obliged to in-
scribe an item brought by the Secretary-General under Article 99. Cf. Lash, Dag Ham.
marskjold's Conception of His Office, 16 INT'L ORGANIZATION 551 (1962-63); GOOD-
RICH, HAMBRO & SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS at 590-591.
59 14 U.N. SCOR, 847th meeting (U.N. Doc. S/PV. 847, Sept. 7, 1959).
60 Under Rule 22 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council
(Doc. S/96/Rev. 5), "The Secretary-General, or his deputy acting on his behalf, may
make either oral or written statements to the Security Council concerning any question
under consideration by it."
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based on the explicit rights granted to the Secretary-General under
Article 99 of the Charter. If it had been so based, the Council
under rule 3 of the provisional rules of procedure, would not have
been free to refuse the Secretary-General to address it - as it is
now free to do - and it would have meant the inscription by the
Secretary-General of a substantive issue on the agenda. 61 In this
latter respect it would necessarily also have involved a judgment as
to facts for which, in the present situation, I have not a sufficient
basis. 62
The Secretary-General's right to bring a matter which in his
opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity to the attention of the Security Council has been generally
recognized as carrying with it the right to take preliminary steps
necessary to determine whether he should act. Thus, Article 99, by
necessary implication, gives him an investigating and exploratory
power. It is quite an innovation to assume that the Secretary-Gen-
eral should be able to form an opinion of his own before going to
the Council; but otherwise Article 99 makes no sense. Speaking
of the "unprecedented political responsibilities" entrusted to the
Secretary-General by Article 99, the United States Representative
Mr. Warren Austin stated in the General Assembly at its first ses-
sion:
We need not await its [Article 99's] full implementation to rec-
ognize that the power of the Secretary-General to study conditions
which in his opinion threaten the peaceful relations of the Mem-
bers of the United Nations and to make recommendations based
on his findings, represents a significant departure from the usual
concepts of international organizaton and national sovereignty. a
During consideration by the Security Council in 1946 of a United
States proposal to establish a Commission to investigate facts relat-
ing to incidents along Greece's northern frontier, Secretary-General
Trygve Lie stated:
Should the proposal of the United States representative not be car-
ried, I hope that the Council will understand that the Secretary-
61 On this point see also pp. 48-49.
62 See note 59 supra at 2-3; see also GOODRICH, HAMBRO & SIMONS, CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 590-591.
Hammarskj6ld later remarked about his action with regard to the Laotian crisis: "I
took it to the Security Council without invoking 99. The Soviets said how can you do
it without invoking 99. I said if I did so you would be obliged to inscribe it and under
Chapter VII. In this way you don't have to inscribe it. The Russians thought that I
was rather cynical. But they had the right to ask for inscription. I can always ask for
less than I am entitled to." Cf. Lash, Dag Hammarskjold's Conception of His Ofice, 16
INT'L ORGANIZATION 551 n.30 (1962-63).
68' Official Records of the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly,
44th Plenary Meeting, October 30, 1946, at 902-903.
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General must reserve his right to make such enquiries or investi-
gations as he may think necessary, in order to determine whether
or not he should consider bringing any aspect of this matter to the
attention of the Council under the provisions of the Charter.
64
The Soviet Representative (who was the President of the Council)
responded:
As the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ...
I think that Mr. Lie was right in raising the question of his rights.
It seems to me that in this case, as in all other cases, the Secretary-
General must act. I have no doubt that he will do so in accordance
with the rights and powers of the Secretary-General as defined in
the Charter of the United Nations.65
No one challenged the Secretary-General's statement, although his
affirmation of his investigatory authority was particularly far-reach-
ing in that it claimed not merely the right to make inquiries or in-
vestigations without authorization from United Nations organs, but
the right to initiate such investigations even in a case where the Se-
curity Council has decided not to look into the matter.6"
While the Security Council was considering the Tunisian com-
plaint of French aggression in July 1961, Hammarskj6ld told the Se-
curity Council that he had received an invitation from the President
of Tunisia to visit the country for an exchange of views, but he went
on to refer to the implications of Article 99:
Quite apart from the fact that it is naturally the duty of the Secre-
tary-General to put himself at the disposal of the Government of a
Member State, if that Government considers a personal contact nec-
essary, my acceptance of the invitation falls within the framework
of the rights and obligations of the Secretary-General, as Article
64 1 U.N. SCOR, 2nd Ser., No. 16, 70th meeting, Sept. 20, 1946, at 404.
65 Id.
66 On this point Professor Kelsen has stated: "It might be doubted whether this in-
terpretation (the affirmation of the Secretary-General's authority to make an investiga-
tion under Article 99 after the Security Council has refused to investigate the matter
under Article 34) corresponds to the intention of the framers of the Charter." H. KEL-
SEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 304 (1950).
Kelsen's viewpoint has been criticised in Schwebel, The Origins and Development
of Article 99 of the Charter, 28 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 380 n.2
(1951): "Professor Kelsen gives no citation of the source of his impression of the in-
tention of the framers of the Charter. On the face of it, it is not unreasonable to sup-
pose that, on the contrary, the framers foresaw that the Secretary-General would wish
to take so profound a step as invoking Article 99 only upon the basis of complete and
objective data gathered, if need be, through his own investigations. It is difficult to see
why the Secretary-General's investigatory authority would not extend to a matter which
the Security Council had declined to investigate, for the essence of Article 99 lies in its
providing an agent of the Organization as a whole who will raise those matters which,
though they may constitute a threat to the peace, states find it impolitic to raise or to
pursue; and particularly in such delicate cases the Secretary-General may not wish to take
the initiative without full and impartial data at his disposal."
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99 of the Charter authorizes him to draw to the attention of the
Security Council what, in his view, may represent a threat to in-
ternational peace and security, and as it is obvious that the duties
following from this Article cannot be fulfilled unless the Secretary-
General, in case of need, is in a position to form a personal opinion
about the relevant facts of the situation which may represent such a
threat.67
On a number of occasions, the Secretary-General has designated
persons to represent him (with the consent of the receiving states)
in situations of'tension for the purpose of keeping him informed re-
garding developments.68
What is known as the Secretary-General's "good offices" refers
essentially to the requisite psychological assistance that a, Secretary-
General might offer to parties in conflict should a spur be needed to
begin negotiations. Arising from "the philosophy of the Charter, as
reflected in Article 99," this notion of good offices "gives the Secre-
tary-General wide political and diplomatic possibilities of action of
a less formal and less public nature."6
One of the "common law" developments to which Hammar-
skjdld called attention in his introduction to the 1959 report on the
work of the Organization" was the growing practice by the Secre-
tary-General of dispatching "personal representatives with the task
of assisting the Governments in their efforts." This was "a further
development of actions of a 'good offices' nature, with which the
Secretary-General is now frequently charged." Such actions were
undertaken "with the consent or at the invitation of Governments
concerned, but without formal decisions of other organs of the
United Nations."'-7 There have been various kinds of situations in
which the good offices of the Secretary-General have played a role."
The discretionary nature of Article 99 would mean not only the
67 16 U.N. SCOR, 964th meeting, July 28, 1961, para 86, at 16-17.
68 Certain examples: Lebanon and Jordan in 1958; Laos in 1959; and Cyprus in
1964.
Referring to the Laos situation Hammarskjfild remarked: "In the case of Laos I said
it may be a threat to peace and security but how can I know? If I am to take the very
serious action of putting into motion Chapter VII, I must know. Therefore, in a poten-
tial case of 99 (Article 99) I can send observers." Cf. Lash, Dag Hammarskjold's Con-
ception of His Office, 16 INT'L ORGANIZATION 551 (1962-63).
69 Cf. Dictated version of extemporaneous remarks by Secretary-General Hammar-
skj6ld, at an official luncheon in Mexico City, April 8, 1959, quoted in Lash, Hammer-
skjold's Conception of His Office, 16 INT'L ORGANIZATION 550 (1962-63).
70 14 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.IA (A/4132/Add.1).
71 Id. at 3.
72 For an account of such instances, see U Thant, A Quiet United Nations Road to
Accord, UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE, July, 1970, at 127-130.
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evident option either to invoke or not to invoke that Article, but,
what is more, the Secretary-General's right to choose the precise
means of responding to a given situation. As a matter of strategy,
he may exert his influence so that it will not be necessary for him for-
mally to bring the matter in question to the attention of the Security
Council. In other words, Article 99 may be interpreted as providing
a specific legal authorization for the extensive, informal, behind-
the-scenes political activities of the Secretary-General that go by the
name good offices.
Referring to the development of actions of a good offices nature,
Hammarskj6ld stated:
Such actions by the Secretary-General fall within the competence of
his office and are, in my view, in other respects also in strict ac-
cordance with the Charter, when they serve its purpose.73
It is one of the purposes of the United Nations:
to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the prin-
ciples of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of
the peace (Article 1(1) ).
This principle is further developed in Article 33, which provides
that:
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall,
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, con-
ciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies
or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.74
As already observed,75 Article 99 empowers the Secretary-Gen-
eral to engage in fact-finding or investigations or other tasks of an
exploratory nature in order to form an opinion as to whether a mat-
ter may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.
If so, his action under Article 99 may coincide with the endeavor of
the parties under Article 33 to settle a conflict by peaceful means,
and he may take the initiative of offering them assistance or, as in
several cases in the past, he may be asked by the parties to help.
73 14 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.lA (A/4132/Add.1), at 3.
74 Further, according to Article 36, "The Security Council should take into consider-
ation any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted
by the parties." This rule has been understood to have reference especially to efforts on a
regional basis or through regional organizations. Cf. Introduction to the Annual Report
of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization (1959), 14 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No.lA (A/4132/Add.1, p.1).
7 5 See pp. 50-52.
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Thus, a combined reading of Articles 33 and 99 gives a legal basis
for the Secretary-General's good offices.
Associated with the Secretary-General's good offices are three
basic concepts. The first is the notion of "quiet diplomacy," essen-
tially an appeal to the international community to utilize the struc-
ture of the United Nations for private behind-the-scenes discussion
of all outstanding issues. The second is the concept of "preventive
diplomacy," the idea that the United Nations' essential justification
in world politics is its ability to intervene quickly in local disputes
to minimize chances of violent conflict while simultaneously reduc-
ing the likelihood of super-power intervention. And the third is the
accompanying notion of a "UN presence." For the United Nations
to succeed in preventive diplomacy, its presence would be crucial in
many cases, and this necessitates an activist role for the Organization,
rather than a passive conference machinery.
Hammarskjbld is considered to be the originator and formulator
of these basic concepts. While Trygve Lie acted on Article 99 in a
statesmanlike way, mostly in the framework of UN "parliamentary"
(public) diplomacy, Hammarskj6ld appeared as the architect of the
new conception of combined public and private diplomacy within
the framework of the United Nations."6 Thus, in a 1955 address at
the University of California at Berkeley, Hammarskjbld warned of
the "propaganda" and "rigidity" introduced into United Nations de-
bates, and suggested a better balance "between conference diplo-
macy and quiet diplomacy.'"" Emphasizing the role of quiet diplo-
macy in the context of Article 99 initiatives, Hammarskjbld stated:
Even this last function of the Secretariat - and by necessity espe-
cially of the Secretary-General personally - is and should be un-
spectacular. The very rules of the game, and the specific position
of the Secretariat inside the system, force the Secretariat in its ac-
tivities as representative of the Organization as a whole to apply
what is now often called quiet diplomacy. Such an activity, in
fact, comes very close to that of a Foreign Office, working along
classical lines as a servant of the Government and of the people -
with a discretion and integrity rendered necessary by the fact that
none of the interests it is there to safeguard and none of the con-
76 Cf. A. ROVINE, THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS - THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN
WORLD POLITICS 1920-1970 328-330; Alexandrowicz, The Secretary-General of the
United Nations, 11 INT'L & COMPARATIVE L. Q. 115-17 (1962).
77 Dag Hammarskj6ld, International Cooperation within the United Nations, Address
at the University of California, Berkeley, June 25, 1955, in SERVANT OF PEACE: A
SELECTION OF THE SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS OF DAG HAMMARSKJOLD 95 (W.
Foote ed. 1962).
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fidences that it may be privileged to enjoy, is its own property but
something entrusted to it by its master, the people.
7 8
The key to the notion of preventive diplomacy is the indepen-
dent position of the United Nations and the Secretary-General. In
his Copenhagen speech of May 1959, Hammarskj6ld stated:
To the extent that events have led the governments to accord an
independent position as spokesman of the United Nations to the
Secretary-General even politically, this has also given him wider
opportunities for independent diplomatic activity ...
[W]hat I should like to call active preventive diplomacy.
may be conducted by the United Nations, through the Secretary-
General or in other forms, in many situations where no government
or group of governments and no regional organization would be
able to act in the same way. That such interventions are possible
for the United Nations is explained by the fact that . . . the orga-
nization has begun to gain a certain independent position, and that
this tendency has led to the acceptance of an independent political
and diplomatic activity on the part of the Secretary-General as the
"neutral" representative of the Organization. 79
Intervention by the Secretary-General as a "third party" (as ne-
gotiator, good offices bearer, or mediator) in a conflict and the trans-
fer of the matter to the forum of the United Nations Secretariat
would help to remove certain deficiencies of traditional methods of
settling international disputes. It has been stated that traditional
diplomatic negotiation is a deficient method for various reasons: 80 it
may not be suitable for settling a dispute objectively; in the absence
of a third party the negotiators tend to bargain; if bargaining power
is unequal, the weaker state is in an unfavorable position; there is
a danger of deadlock in negotiations; and if complex problems arise,
they may be beyond the capacity of diplomatic negotiators. If, on
the other hand, diplomatic negotiations are transferred to the United
Nations forum and carried out with the assistance of the Secretary-
General, it is possible to attempt an objective settlement because the
negotiators will act within the framework of the UN Charter and its
principles; their bargaining discretion will be reduced by a multi-
lateral approach to problems in which all members of the Organiza-
tion have a direct or indirect influence; the unfavorable position of
weaker states can be improved by bargaining against the background
of wider United Nations interests; the danger of a deadlock can be
78 Id. at 94-95.
79 Dag Hammarskj61d, Do We Need the United Nations? - An Affirmative An-
swer (Copenhagen speech, May 2, 1959), in UNITED NATIONS REVIEw, June, 1959,
at 26.
80 J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 68-69 (1959).
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overcome with the help of the Secretary-General, sometimes by pro-
viding a needed face-saving device; 81 and the complexity of prob-
lems can be reduced with the assistance of the Secretariat which can
put its expert knowledge at the disposal of the negotiating parties.
Articles 7 and 99 of the Charter, taken together, provide suffi-
cient justification for the Secretary-General's initiatives without in-
structions, and for his right and obligation to take action when a
vacuum has appeared in the systems set up to safeguard peace and
security. Hammarskjbld held the view that "the Secretary-General
shall be the organ of the United Nations which can bring the United
Nations out of deadlock.' '82
On the occasion of his reappointment in September 1957, Ham-
marskjdld stated in the General Assembly that he did not believe
that the Secretary-General should be asked to act "if no guidance for
his action is to be found either in the Charter or in the decisions of
the main organs of the United Nations." But he added:
on the other hand, I believe that it is in keeping with the philosophy
of the Charter that the Secretary-General should be expected to act
also without such guidance, should this appear to him necessary in
order to help in filling any vacuum that may appear in the systems
which the Charter and traditional diplomacy provide for the safe-
guarding of peace and security. 83
Within one year of Hammarskj6ld's reappointment, his interpre-
tation was put to test when the Security Council was deadlocked
(because of a Soviet veto) over Lebanon's complaint of intervention
in its internal affairs by the United Arab Republic. He then made
the following statement in the Security Council conveying clearly
his sense of responsibility:
81 For example, the Secretary-General's role in the dispute between the Netherlands
and Indonesia over West New Guinea (West Irian) and in the Cuban Missile crisis.
See ROVINE, THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS - THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN WORLD
POLITICS 1920-1970, 367-368, 371. See also U Thant, The Role of the Secretary-Gen-
eral - Address at the annual luncheon of the Dag Hammarskjold Memorial Scholarship
Fund of the United Nations Correspondents Association, Sept. 16, 1971, in UN
MONTHLY CHRONICLE, October, 1971, at 186.
As regards the face-saving function of the UN and of its Secretary-General, U Thant
had stated: "In certain situations the United Nations and the Office of the Secretary-Gen-
eral can provide a useful middle ground on which the parties may meet without any loss
of face or prestige, and accommodate their differences in a civilised and dignified manner.
I like to think that the United Nations played a useful role of this kind in the resolution
of the Cuban crisis ...." U Thant, The United Nations as a Force for Peace - Message
sent by the Secretary-General to the people of Sweden when he was unable to keep a
speaking engagement there on May 1, 1963, in UNITED NATIONS REVIEW, May, 1963,
at 38-39.
82 Cf. Lash, Dag Hammarskjold's Conception of His Office, 16 INT'L ORGANIZATION
551 (1962-63).
83 12 U.N. GAOR, 690th Plenary meeting, Sept. 26, 1957, paras. 72-73.
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The Security Council has just failed to take additional action in
the grave emergency facing us. However, the responsibility of the
United Nations to make all efforts to live up to the purposes and
principles of the Charter remains ...
I am sure that I will be acting in accordance with the wishes of
the members of the Council if I . . . use all opportunities offered
to the Secretary-General, within the limits set by the Charter and
towards developing the United Nations effort, so as to help to pre-
vent a further deterioration of the situation in the Middle East ....
First of all . . . this will mean further development of the Ob-
servation Group [in Lebanon]. The Council will excuse me for
not being able to spell out at this moment what it may mean be-
yond that. 84
The Secretary-General has found a source of authority in his po-
sition as head of one of the principal organs of the United Nations
committed to upholding the purposes and principles of the Organi-
zation. It is this concept of inherent responsibility that has been
forcefully expressed in Hammarskj6ld's statement, quoted above, in
the General Assembly on the occasion of his re-election in Septem-
ber 1957.
Many actions of the Secretary-General, particularly in the field of
peace and security, can only be justified with great difficulty under
particular grants of authority by the provisions of the Charter or res-
olutions of the principal organs. Such actions are usually justified
on the basis that certain powers are inherent in the office of the Secre-
tary-General. Generally, these powers are diplomatic in nature.
When Hammarskj61d was requested by the General Assembly
in December 1954 to seek the release of United States airmen in
Communist China, he had to invoke his general authority under the
Charter in carrying out his mission, because the Peking Govern-
ment refused to recognize the validity of the General Assembly res-
olution.8 5 He later explained the device adopted in relation to his
mission to Peking as follows:
The Peking Formula meant that if an organ of the United Nations
asks the Secretary-General to do something and does so without
delegating its authority, he has only the authority vested in him
under the Charter. The resolution is only an instruction to him to
use the authority he has under the Charter, although he is, of course,
guided by the resolution.86
In April 1956, when the Security Council requested Hammar-
84 13 U.N. SCOR, 837th meeting, July 22, 1958, paras. 10-16.
85 General Assembly Resolution 906(IX), December 10, 1954; cf. Lash, supra note
82, at 548.
86Id. For an account of the Secretary-General's mission to Peking, see UNITED
NATIONS REVIEW, February, 1955, at 2-8.
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skj6ld to take steps in support of the Middle-East armistice agree-
ments, he significantly stated that "[it] is obvious that the request
neither detracts from nor adds to the authority of the Secretary-Gen-
eral under the Charter.''87
There are several other cases88 of functions of a diplomatic and
political character undertaken by the Secretary-General under his in-
herent powers. Implicit in such cases is the doctrine that the
Secretary-General's authority is autonomous and coordinate with that
of the other principal organs and derived from the "Charter as a
whole."'89
In the history of the United Nations during the last twenty-
nine years Article 99 has been specifically invoked only once by a
Secretary-General - by Dag Hammarskj6ld in the Congo crisis of
1960.0 Although Article 99 gives the Secretary-General the unique
right and responsibility to "bring to the attention of the Security
Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the mainte-
nance of international peace and security," he is subject to severe
practical limitations imposed by the political realities of internation-
al life. His political position is not sufficiently strong to permit
him to oppose a major power, except under circumstances which
enable him to exercise effective counter-influence. In the Congo situ-
ation, the Secretary-General was on firm ground when he invoked
Article 99, because there was no opposition from any quarter. "At
that time, all the African States wanted the Secretary-General to in-
87 11 U.N; SCOR, 722nd meeting, April 4, 1956, at 11-12.
88 Certain cases: (1) Hammarskj6ld again used the Peking Formula when asked by
the Security Council in April 1960 to consult with the Government of the Union of South
Africa and "make such arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes
of the Charter" in regard to South Africa's segregation policies. South Africa invoking
Article 2(7) refused to recognise the Council's competence in the matter but did agree to
consultations with the Secretary-General "on the basis of the authority of the Secretary-
General under the Charter." U.N. Doc. S/4305, April 19, 1960.
(2) The Secretary-General assisted in establishing normal relations between Cam-
bodia and Thailand, first in 1958-59 and again in 1962-64.
(3) U Thant's role in the West Irian question (1962); (4) in the Cuban Missile crisis
(1962); (5) in the situation of rival regimes in Yemen (1963).
89 Cf. Lash, supra note 82, at 550.
90 U.N. Doc. S/4381, July 13, 1960.
Secretary-General Trygve Lie's intervention in connection with the Korean question
in June 1950 did not, strictly speaking, constitute an application of Article 99, although
he la'er affirmed that on the Korean question "for the first time I invoked Article 99 of
the Charter." (Cf. Address to the General Assembly on September 28, 1950, GAOR,
5th Session, 289th Plenary meeting, September 28, 1950, at 176). In that case it was in
fact the United States rather than the Secretary-General that initially drew the crisis to the
attention of the Security Council. U.N. Doc. S/1495, June 25, 1950.
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yoke that Article. All the big Powers, permanent members of the
Security Council, wanted him to invoke that Article."'"
Another factor restraining the Secretary-General would be his
concern for his own prestige (and the prestige of the Organization)
in a case where he has invoked Article 99, but the Security Council
has failed to deal with the matter effectively.
To say that Article 99 has been invoked but once is not to say
that it has not often been employed. The very possibility of its use
has been an important influence. Its presence itself, without formal
invocation, provides the virtually incontrovertible legal justification
for a great part of the Secretary-General's political action.
Factors that have Influenced the Development of the Political
Role of the Secretary-General
The foregoing account of the development of the political role
of the UN Secretary-General helps to identify the various factors
that have influenced such development. Among them the most basic
is the Secretary-General's constitutional authority, i.e., the legal au-
thority which the UN Charter grants him.
Of equal importance to the specific provisions of the Charter in
explaining the evolution of the Secretary-General's role is the man-
ner in which these provisions have been interpreted. One of the
notable features of United Nations development has been the gen-
erally accepted practice of interpreting the Charter as a constitution
and not simply as a treaty. The Secretary-General, as a principal
organ of the Organization, is competent to interpret the Charter
within the scope of his activities. Like the other principal organs,
he necessarily construes his own legal powers and applies the Char-
ter or other rules of law to concrete situations. 2 Hammarskj6ld's
achievement in the development of the political role of the Secre-
tary-General is mainly attributable to the fact that he rejected "a
restrictive literal interpretation" of the Charter and favored a "freer
interpretation." Thus, he declared:
91 Cf. U Thant's statement at his Press Conference at UN Headquarters on June 11,
1970, in UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE, July, 1970, at 113.
92 The question as to how and by what organ or organs of the Organization should
the Charter be interpreted was considered by Committee IV/2 at the San Francisco Con-
ference. The Committee stated: "In the course of the operations from day to day of the
various organs of the Organization, it is inevitable that each organ will interpret such
parts of the Charter as are applicable to its particular functions. This process is inherent
in the functioning of any body which operates under an instrument defining its functions
and powers." 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 668 (1945).
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What we are seeing is an evolution on the basis of a fundamental
charter of sufficient flexibility to permit a continuous adaptation of
constitutional life to the needs.9 3
Closely related to the legal bases of the Secretary-General's
powers under the Charter and helping to explain the liberal way in
which they have been interpreted is the newly evolved conception of
the nature of the United Nations as a living organism with capacity
for continuous adaptation, the limits of whose reach are determined
only by the Purposes and Principles of the Charter. As pointed out
by Hammarskj6ld in the introduction to his 1961 report on the work
of the Organization, there have been two competing views regard-
ing the nature of the United Nations. On the one hand, it has
been regarded as a "static conference machinery" for resolving con-
flicts, while on the other hand it has been viewed as:
a dynamic instrument of Governments through which they, jointly
and for the same purpose, should seek such reconciliation but
through which they should also try to develop forms of executive
action, undertaken on behalf of all Members, and aiming at fore-
stalling conflicts and resolving them, once they have arisen, by ap-
propriate diplomatic or political means, in a spirit of objectivity
and in implementation of the principles and purposes of the Charter.
• . . The first concept can refer to history and to the traditions of
national policies of the past. The second can point to the needs of
the present and of the future in a world of ever-closer international
interdependence .... The first one is firmly anchored in the time-
honoured philosophy of sovereign national States in armed compe-
tition . . . The second one envisages possibilities of intergovern-
mental action overriding such a philosophy, and opens the road
towards more developed and increasingly effective forms of con-
structive international cooperation.9 4
This new conception of the dynamic nature of the United Na-
tions has had wide acceptance, particularly among the newer na-
tions. Its acceptance carries with it the recognition of the General
Assembly and the Councils as more than mere diplomatic confer-
ences, as possessing some of the characteristics of parliamentary or-
gans, and also encourages expanding the political role of the Secre-
tary-General, both in respect of his independent initiatives and in
respect of his executive role in carrying out tasks assigned to him.
An important causal factor in the development of the political
role of the Secretary-General has been the political environment in
which the United Nations has functioned. The Charter gives the
Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of
93 See Hammarskj6ld, supra note 79.
94 16 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.1A (A/4800/Add.1), at 1.
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international peace and security (Article 24), and the terms of the
Charter leave little doubt that the original intent of the framers of
that document was to make the Security Council the executive or-
gan. However, when the Security Council became deadlocked be-
cause of the deepening divisions between the Soviet Union and the
major non-communist powers, as evidenced by the mounting num-
ber of Soviet vetoes, the principal responsibility for political prob-
lems shifted from the Security Council to the General Assembly.
This radical adjustment in the balance of power between the two
political organs culminated in the adoption in 1950 of the "Uniting
for Peace" resolution which represented a forthright assumption by
the General Assembly of responsibility in the area of international
peace? The constitutional development based on the "Uniting for
Peace" resolution has become part of the generally accepted United
Nations doctrine.
The General Assembly, however, lacked the powers of the Se-
curity Council, particularly the power to make decisions binding on
member states. Moreover, the Assembly, because of its very nature,
its size, the variety of interests represented, and its operating proce-
dures, was incapable of exercising executive functions directly and
continuously. This resulted in the further shift in responsibility for
carrying out such functions to the Secretary-General."6
Another aspect of the political environment influencing the de-
velopment of the Secretary-General's political role has been the
emergence of a large number of new independent States in Asia and
Africa and the consequent expansion of the membership of the
United Nations after the membership breakthrough at the tenth
session of the General Assembly. This resulted in a changed bal-
ance of influence in the U.N. and this shift in the balance of forces
became particularly evident when crises were transferred from the
Security Council to the General Assembly.
These new States were naturally anxious that outside assistance
should not lead to the reinstatement of colonial control. Under-
standably, therefore, while they preferred UN assistance (whether
in economic or social development or in establishing conditions of
internal security and order and providing protection against outside
95 General Assembly Resolution 377 A(V) of November 3, 1950.
96 For example, the Secretary-General was entrusted with the task of dealing with
the Middle-East crisis in 1956. However, entrusting the task to the Secretary-General
was not the only course open to the General Assembly - it could have followed its earlier
practice (as in the Greek, Palestine and Korean questions) of appointing a person outside
the Secretariat or setting up a committee or commission to do the work.
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intervention), they looked to the Secretary-General as the one who
could most safely be trusted with the organization and direction of
that assistance. This attitude not only encouraged initiatives by the
Secretary-General to carry out programs approved by the General
Assembly and the Councils, but it also provided him with an im-
portant political support. It is significant that Hammarskj6ld, in
defending himself against Soviet attacks over his conduct on the
Congo operation, projected himself as the defender of the small
states when he declared:
It is not the Soviet Union or, indeed, any other big Powers which
need the United Nations for their protection. It is all the others.
In this sense, the Organization is first of all their organization,
and I deeply believe in the wisdom with which they will be
able to use it and guide it. I shall remain in my post during the
term of my office as a servant of the Organization in the interests of
all those other nations, as long as they wish me to do so.97
Hammarskj6ld's assertion that the UN is "their organization" is
meaningful not only in the sense originally intended, that is, pro-
tection of small power interests, but also in larger system terms.
Another factor which has vitally influenced the enlargement of
the political role of the Secretary-General is the establishment of
permanent missions of member states at United Nations Headquar-
ters. This important institutional advance is a development which
was not foreseen when the Charter was written. It is true that the
Charter requires that each member of the Security Council shall be
represented at all times at the seat of the Organization, in order
that the Council may be able to fulfil the requirement that it "be
so organised as to be able to function continuously" (Article 28
(1)). But no Charter provision made it essential for the members
of the United Nations to maintain permanent delegations at its
Headquarters. The permanent delegations constitute an institution
which has grown up as a by-product of the General Assembly and of
the continuity of conference arrangements at Headquarters.
Though the permanent delegations are collectively of the great-
est importance in the functioning of the United Nations, they have,
unlike the Secretariat, no corporate organization of their own. It
has, therefore, become an essential function of the Secretary-General
to act as a channel for communication and for consultation between
delegations.
Relations between the Secretary-General and the permanent
97 15 U.N. GAOR, 883rd meeting, October 3, 1960, at 332 (emphasis added).
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missions are largely of an informal character. Through the instru-
mentality of the permanent representatives, the Secretary-General
is able to discuss alternative approaches to problems before the
United Nations and to ensure that his own views are placed before
governments. There has thus devolved on the Secretary-General a
considerable share of responsibility in the formulation of any con-
sensus of views among delegations on specific issues under consid-
eration. 8 The importance of this continual contact, both for the
Secretary-General and for the United Nations as a whole, was em-
phasized by Hammarskj6ld in the introduction to his 1959 report
on the work of the Organization:
The permanent representation at Headquarters of all Member na-
tions, and the growing diplomatic contribution of the permanent
delegations outside the public meetings - often in close contact
with the Secretariat - may well come to be regarded as the most
important "common law" development which has taken place so far
within the constitutional framework of the Charter. 09
U Thant held this same view. 00
The special relationship of the Secretary-General to the delega-
tions is clearly evidenced by the establishment of the Advisory Com-
mittees composed of the representatives of delegations for the oper-
ation in the Middle-East (UNEF) and the Congo (ONUC). He
consulted with these bodies repeatedly and presided at their meet-
ings. There were no votes, all the meetings being informal. 10'
A number of resources at the command of the Secretary-General
have contributed to the development of his executive and political
functions. These include: (1) the natural advantages the Secre-
tary-General enjoys, as a permanent full-time official with a knowl-
edgeable staff and skilled personnel, in his relations with the Gen-
eral Assembly and the Councils; (2) political information, primar-
ily in the form of information on the policies and political views of
98 Cf. Cordier, The Role of the Secretary-General, in R. SWIFT (ed.), ANNUAL RE-
VIEW OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS 1960-61 (Oceana Publications), 4, 10. (Mr. An-
drew W. Cordier was the Executive Assistant to the first two Secretaries-General of the
UN, Trygve Lie and Hammarskjold.)
9914 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.lA (A/4132/Add.1), at 2.
100 Cf. U Thant, The Role of the Secretary-General - Address at the annual lunch-
eon of the Dag Hammarskj6ld Memorial Scholarship Fund of the United Nations Corres-
pondents Association, September 16, 1971 in UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE, October,
1971, 185.
101 See Cordier, supra note 98, at 9. In a sense, it could be said that these Commit-
tees were anomalous bodies: composed of the representatives of delegations, external to
the Secretariat, yet sitting under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General who sought
to formulate the conclusions to be derived from the discussion.
.1974]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
member nations; (3) adequate communication facilities; (4) the
Secretary-General's structural position as the focal point of the Or-
ganization and, thus, his status as one of the central figures of the
international system; (5) the Secretary-General's neutrality and,
thus, his acceptability to competing powers in the international
arena; (6) the Secretary-General's record of success in dealing with
particular cases; and (7) the prestige and respect accorded the Secre-
tary-General, a resource largely dependent upon the success attribut-
able to the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Office.
An important factor contributing to the development of the
political role of the Secretary-General is the personality of the Secre-
tary-General. Trygve Lie acted on the assumption that the Secre-
tary-General had a positive role to play and he established the expec-
tation that the office would be a diplomatically active one. He did
not hesitate to express his views on controversial matters and to take
initiatives on his own responsibility. 0 2 But his actual influence on
the other organs and on the decisions and conduct of member gov-
ernments was not large. Unlike Hammarskj6ld, he could not cre-
ate for the office an image of an effective instrument of peaceful
settlement of political conflicts. Hammarskj6ld, on the other hand,
was able, through a combination of diplomatic skill and full exploi-
tation of the powers vested in him, to make the office of Secretary-
General a major influence in the discharge of the peace-keeping
responsibility of the United Nations. Undoubtedly, Hammarskj6ld's
personality was an important factor in explaining the expansion
of the Secretary-General's influence and importance during his
tenure (1953-1961). After Hammarskj6ld's successes first in the
UN fliers dispute of 1954103 and later in the Middle-East conflicts
of 1956, the attitude of the member states regarding the utility of
the Secretary-General as a diplomatic agent underwent a marked
change. Member states had come to recognize his diplomatic prow-
ess. Hammarskj6ld thus came to possess what has been described
as "the subtle resources of power and prestige deriving in part from
past successes in implementing UN resolutions.' '14
As a result of the recognition of Hammarskj6ld's superior diplo-
102 For a comprehensive discussion of the role of Trygve Lie and the precedents he
established in the field of independent diplomatic initiatives by the Secretary-General, see
S. SCHWEBEL, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS : His POLITICAL
POWERS AND PRACTICE (1952).
103 See note 85 supra.
104 Cf. Thompson, The New Diplomacy and the Quest or Peace, 19 INT'L ORGANI-
ZATiON 404 (1965).
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matic skills and the confidence he inspired by his ability to achieve
diplomatic successes, there developed the practice of creating peace-
keeping operations under the executive direction of the Secretary-
General." 5 This practice of the member states significantly contrib-
uted to the development of the peaceful settlement activities of the
Secretary-General. Attributing the increasingly active and influen-
tial role of the Secretary-General in the mid-1950's to Hammar-
skj6ld's abilities, one scholar has observed:
It is incontestable that recent developments and successes of the
private diplomacy of the United Nations . . .owe much to the per-
sonality of "Mr. H," to his exceptional qualities that all the dele-
gates and all the governments have recognised. It is not only as a
result of his functions but also his intuitu personnai that he has
become the fifth great power.10 6
U Thant had endorsed the convictions and the objectives which
were cherished by his predecessor.' However, coming as he does
from a different background,'1 8 U Thant inevitably brought to the
Office his own personality, ideas and methods.
U Thant's Conception of the Political Role of his Office
Dag Hammarskj6ld, in his eight years of Secretary-Generalship,
gave the Office a new meaning and a new place in international
life. He died at the height of a controversy over the nature and
function of the United Nations as a political organization and over
the role of the Secretary-General; "a controversy," observed U Thant
105 Examples: The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Suez crisis
(1956); United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in the Middle-East
crisis (1958); UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in the Congo crisis (1960-61).
106 4 M. VIRALLY, ANNUAIRE FRANCAISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 396-97
(1958), quoted in Zacher, The Secretary-General and the United Nations' Function of
Peaceful Settlement, 20 INT'L ORGANIZATION 732 (1966).
The description of Hammarskj6ld as the "fifth great power" refers to his having been
invited by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to attend a summit meeting with the four
Great Powers and India in July, 1958, to discuss the Middle-East crisis. Cf. The New
York Times, July 20, 1958, at 1.
107 U Thant made a statement to this effect before the Second Hammarskj6ld Forum
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on April 30, 1962. See L. Tondel,
(ed.), THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN THE CONGO: BACK-
GROUND PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND HAMMARSKJOLD FORUM XIV
(1963).
108 U Thant, on his appointment as Acting Secretary-General, stated in the General
Assembly on November 3, 1961: "Most of my colleagues present in this hall know me
personally. They know that I come from a relatively small country in Asia. They know
also that my country has steadfastly pursued over the years a policy of non-alignment and
friendship for all other nations, whatever their ideologies. In my new role I shall con-
tinue to maintain this attitude of objectivity and pursue the ideal of universal friend-
ship." 16 U.N. GAOR, 1046th Plenary meeting, November 3, 1961, at 551.
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in September 1971, "which is still by no means resolved."1 °  Ham-
marskjbld's view of the UN and the office of the Secretary-General
was articulated in the introductions to his 1959 and 1961 reports on
the work of the Organization. 1 0 These two reports were not entire-
ly of the "usual" character. They dealt with questions of political
philosophy and theory and problems that had to do with the devel-
opment of the Organization in the future. As already seen,"' in
the ultimate analysis, there are three basic concepts associated par-
ticularly with Dag Hammarskj6ld: quiet diplomacy, preventive di-
plomacy and UN presence. The notion of a combined public and
private diplomacy within the UN framework was his innovation.
His successor U Thant stated after nearly ten years of Secretary-
Generalship: "My own experience has confirmed in every way Dag
Hammarskjbld's philosophy concerning the powers of the Organiza-
tion and, in particular, the role of the Secretary-General." 1 2 He ex-
pressed his
fervent conviction that the incumbent of the Office of Secretary-
General must play a political role, necessarily circumspect and ju-
dicious, if he is to be of real assistance to Member States in a dy-
namic and imaginative search for peace and for the realisation of
the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 113
U Thant's commitment to the legacy left by Hammarskjdld is
also evident in the following statement:
The efforts and experiences, achievements and failures, of successive
Secretaries-General are the raw-materials out of which the Office has
developed over the years on the basis of the very general description
which is given in the Charter. . . . Each Secretary-General must
build as best he can on the Office as he inherited it. If he cannot
hope to repeat all the successes of his predecessors, neither should
he fear to try again where they failed.
No Secretary-General can afford to lose a sense of obligation
to the human community in its broadest sense - an obligation to
give his utmost to make the principles and aims of the Charter a
reality . . . . Hammarskjbld never lost for a moment this sense of
obligation, and I myself have regarded it, during my 10 years in
109 See U Thant, supra note 100, at 178.
110 14 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.IA (A/4132/Add.1); and 16 U.N. GAOR supp.
No.IA (A/4800/Add.1).
M' See p. 54.
112 Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organi-
zation for the year 1970-1971, in UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE, October, 1971, at 119.
This contains a review by U Thant of the political role of the Secretary-General as he
has "found it to be in law and in practice," very similar to the concepts expressed by
Hammarskj6ld in the introduction to his 1961 report. See id. at 118-122.
113 Id. at 122.
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office, as the primary rule which nothing can be allowed to ob-
scure.
11 4
It may also be recalled that in his address to the Security Council
on October 24, 1962 on the Cuban missile crisis, U Thant cited, and
thereby associated himself with, Dag Hammarskj6ld's famous state-
ment 1 5 to the Security Council in 1956 at the beginning of the Suez
crisis:
The principles of the Charter are, by far, greater than the organi-
zation in which they are embodied, and the aims which they are
to safeguard are holier than the policies of any single nation or peo-
ple. . . . [Tjhe discretion and impartiality . . . imposed on the
Secretary-General by the character of his immediate task may not
degenerate into a policy of expediency . . . . A Secretary-General
cannot serve on any other assumption than that - within the nec-
essary limits of human frailty and honest differences of opinion -
all Member-nations honour their pledge to serve all articles of the
Charter .... 116
U Thant had continued his predecessor's policy of taking politi-
cal and diplomatic initiatives. The Congo operation continued. In
1962, on his own responsibility, he acceded to a request from the
Netherlands and Indonesia that the United Nations should establish
a temporary executive authority for West New Guinea (West
Irian) .117 The following year he agreed to the dispatch of United
Nations Observers to the Yemen (UNYOM), and the matter was
discussed and approved by the Security Council only as a result of a
request from the Soviet Government.118 Also in 1963, at the request
of Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines, he agreed to "ascertain
the wishes" of the people of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak
regarding the future status of the two territories."' More recently,
in 1970, at the request of Iran and the United Kingdom, he assisted
in the determination of the wishes of the people of Bahrain regard-
ing the future status of that island. 2 °  He had sought, through
personal representatives, to resolve certain specific political differ-
114 See U Thant, supra note 100, at 179-80; see also U Thant, supra note 107.
115 11 U.N. SCOR, 751st meeting, October 31, 1956, at 1-2.
110 17 U.N. SCOR, 1024th meeting, October 24, 1962, at 22-23.
117 17 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda item 89, A/5170 (August 20, 1962).
118 U.N. Docs. S/5298, April 29, 1963; S/5321, May 27, 1963, S/5326, June 8,
1963; S/5331, June 11, 1963.
119 U.N. Doc. SG/1583, September 13, 1963; YEARBOOK U.N. 1963, at 41; UNITED
NATIONS REVIEW, October, 1963, at 14-15.
120 Cf. U Thant,'A Quiet United Nations Road to Accord - Address to the Royal
Commonwealth Society in London, June 15, 1970, in UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE,
July, 1970, at 122.
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ences between particular States, such as Cambodia and Thailand in
the period from 1961 to 1968, Rwanda and Burundi in 1963 and
1964, India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1966, Guinea and the Ivory
Coast in 1967, Equatorial Guinea and Spain in 1969, and Ghana
and the Soviet Union in 1969.21 There had also been humanitar-
ian missions in situations such as the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970)
and East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971 where political elements
were naturally involved. 22
In 1966, while indicating his unwillingness to continue in office
for a second term, U Thant commented on his position:
To be candid, I feel that I have found it increasingly difficult to
function as Secretary-General in the manner in which I wish to
function, and secondly, I do not subscribe to the view that the Sec-
retary-General should be just a chief administrative officer, or, in
other words, that the Secretary-General should be a glorified clerk.
I do not accept this concept of the Secretary-General. As I have
said repeatedly on previous occasions, besides the functions of ad-
ministration, the Secretary-General must take the necessary initia-
tives in the political and diplomatic fields. These political and
diplomatic initiatives, in my view, are an essential part of the func-
tions of the Secretary-General.' 23
However, U Thant was not quite consistent in his pronounce-
ments concerning an independent role of the Secretary-General. In
1964 he had asserted:
... the Secretary-General is very much a servant of the Organiza-
tion and can act only within the mandates given to him in a par-
ticular situation by the Security Council or the General Assembly
and in close and continuous consultation with the Members of the
Organization and with the Governments particularly concerned in a
given problem. Should this cease to be the case, the position of the
Secretary-General would very rapidly become so exposed as to be un-
tenable.124
He sounded a substantially different note in 1965 under the impact
of the rapid escalation of the Vietnam conflict:
121 Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organiza-
tion for the year 1970-1971 in UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE, October, 1971, at 120.
1221d.; see also UN Doc.S/10512, January 17, 1972, for the report of the Secretary-
General on the good offices mission of his Special Representative for humanitarian prob-
lems in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) under Security Council Resolution 307 (1971) of
December 21, 1971.
123 UN Press Release SG/SM/567, September 19, 1966, at 4 (Excerpts reproduced
in PORTFOLIO FOR PEACE, published by the UN Office of Public Information, 1970,
at 13).
124 U Thant, Strengthening of the United Nations - Address delivered at the Uni-
versity of Denver, April 3, 1964, in UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE, May, 1964, at 83.
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Two simple considerations are inescapable. First, the Secretary-
General must always be prepared to take an initiative, no matter
what the consequences to him or his office may be, if he sincerely be-
lieves that it might mean the difference between peace and war. In
such a situation the personal prestige of a Secretary-General - and
even the position of his office - must be considered to be expend-
able. The second cardinal consideration must be the maintenance
of the Secretary-General's independent position, which alone can
give him the freedom to act, without fear or favour in the interests
of world peace. Such an independence does not imply any disre-
spect of the wishes or opinions of member governments. On the
contrary, his independence is an insurance that the Secretary-Gen-
eral will be able to serve the long-term interest in peace of all the
Members of the Organization in full accordance with his oath of
Office. 125
Asserting that "in matters relating to international peace and secur-
ity, the Secretary-General's responsibility requires a continuous ex-
amination of the possibilities of effective action," U Thant made an
identical statement more recently, in September 1971.126 This was
based on the view that "Article 99 leaves no doubt that any poten-
tial threat to peace and security must be of concern to [the Secre-
tary-General], and that he has a duty to do what he can to mitigate
it. ''127
U Thant described the Secretary-General's activity known as the
exercise of good offices as:
potentially one of the most useful, and least understood, possibil-
ities of the United Nations. It is one way of preventing differences
between States from developing into major crises, and of getting
results on sensitive problems before they reach the insoluble stage.
This is peace-making rather than peace-keeping, and its object is
prevention rather than cure.1 2 8
With regard to the competence of the Secretary-General to use
his good offices without specific authorization from another organ of
the United Nations, U Thant stated:
Under the heading of good offices, I do not include .. .the wide
variety of tasks which the Secretary-General undertakes at the for-
mal request of the General Assembly, the Security Council and of
the other main organs of the United Nations .... 129
I have never had any doubt that the Secretary-General, with Ar-
125 U Thant, The Harmonizing Functions of the United Nations - Statement read
at the convocation of Queen's University at Kingston, Ontario, May 22, 1965, in UN
MONTHLY CHRONICLE, June, 1965, at 103.
126 See U Thant, supra note 100, at 186-87.
127 Id. at 183.
128 See U Thant, supra note 120.
129 Id. at 124.
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ticle 33 in mind, must exercise his good offices in the settlement
of disputes or difficulties, even without specific authorisation from
the Security Council or another organ of the United Nations, when
the States concerned request it. As I was obliged to point out to
the President of the Security Council over the case of Equatorial
Guinea in March 1969, my informing him of my intention to send
a representative to that country at the request of the Governments
concerned was in no sense a consultation, and I was merely fol-
lowing the previously established practice of taking action and keep-
ing the Security Council informed of what I was doing.' 30
U Thant also held the view that "there are some situations so
serious that the Secretary-General himself may decide that his duty
requires him to offer his good offices, even if no specific request for
them has been made by the parties.""' Thus, "the enormous and
imminent dangers of the Cuban missile crisis" in 1962 "impelled"
him to offer his good offices which helped in establishing contacts
through which the United States, the Soviet Union and Cuba finally
reached a solution of the crisis. Similarly, although the United Na-
tions as such has not been involved in the Vietnam conflict," 2 U
Thant has felt obliged to offer his good offices (but with little re-
sult so far) in his "personal capacity" and to make suggestions con-
cerning the Vietnam situation."'
As already indicated,"4 U Thant has undertaken a variety of
other good offices efforts, with varying degrees of success. It is of
interest to recall that, in September 1971, referring to his exercise
of good offices with regard to the question of Soviet citizens of the
Jewish faith desiring to leave the Soviet Union, U Thant observed:
The question of human rights vis-h-vis the concept of the domestic
jurisdiction of a Member State as prescribed in Article 2, para-
graph 7, of the Charter has been a perennial preoccupation of many
130 See U Thant, supra note 100, at 184; see also the Introduction to the Annual Re-
port of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, Sept. 1969, 24 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. IA (A/7601/Add.1), at 21-22.
131 Cf. U Thant, supra note 120, at 124.
132 Viet-Nam was technically placed on the Security Council's agenda early in 1966 at
the request of the United States, but nothing ever came of this. Both the Soviet Union
and France argued at the time that the Geneva conference, instead of the United Nations,
was the appropriate forum, as most of the parties involved in the conflict were not United
Nations Members. United Nations Press Release WS/554, May 12, 1972, at 3.
133 See U Thant, supra note 120, at 124; Report, supra note 121, at 99-100.
Incidentally, the present Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim has also offered his good
offices with regard to the Viet-Nam conflict. It has been reported that he has felt the
time has come to use "the full machinery of the United Nations, first to achieve a cessa-
tion of hostilities and then to assist in the search for a peaceful and lasting settlement of
the problem." UN Press Release WS/554, May 12, 1972, at 1.
134 See pp. 67-68; see also note 120, supra, at 127-30, for a brief account of U
Thant's exercise of good offices.
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Member States in several deliberative organs of the United Nations.
This is an area where the Secretary-General may be able to help, in
spite of the legal and practical limitations, by discreet exercise of his
good offices. 13 5
Closely connected with the Secretary-General's exercise of good
offices is one of the Purposes of the United Nations that it "be a
center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of
S. .common ends" (Article 1(4) of the Charter). U Thant consid-
ers that "this harmonizing aspect of the United Nations . . . is the
most important provision of the Charter,'' 30 "a function which has
still not been exploited to the full.'"'17 He has spoken approvingly
of President Roosevelt's 1944 description of the UN's Chief Execu-
tive Officer as the "Moderator," because, in his view, the primary
function of the chief executive of the UN is "to moderate, to con-
ciliate, to find a consensus, to harmonize.""' Thus, in September
1971, U Thant declared:
I have always felt that the most important political duty of the Sec-
retary-General was to concentrate on the harmonizing functions of
the United Nations as set out in Article 1(4) of the Charter. I
have tried to use my Office, with all the discretion that the impor-
tance of the task requires, to allay unnecessary fears and suspicions,
to establish communication between conflicting parties and to do
whatever I could to bridge the gulf between East and West.1 9
The emphasis of Article 1(4) of the Charter is on the necessity
of agreement as a basis for action, a broad working consensus of the
Organization's members in support of decisions taken. Apart from
the cases where reference has been made to the purposes and prin-
ciples of the United Nations generally, there have been few spe-
cific references to Article 1(4) in the resolutions of the United Na-
tions organs and in the statements of government representatives.
Yet, it is undeniable that there must be harmonization of the policies
and actions of states if the United Nations is to achieve practical re-
sults. U Thant, thus, rightly stressed the importance of Article 1(4)
of the Charter.
Towards the end of his ten-year tenure of Secretary-General-
135 Statement by the Secretary-General at the Annual Dinner of "UN We Believe,"
at New York, N.Y., September 24, 1971, UN Press Release SG/SM/1539 at 3.
136 Speech at a seminar on 'Peaceful Change,' organised by the Institute of Man and
Science, at State University of New York, Albany, Sept. 8, 1966, UN Press Release SG/
SM/562 (Excerpts reproduced in Portfolio for Peace, published by the UN Office of
Public Information, 1970, at 12).
137 See U Thant, supra note 125, at 104.
13s See note 136 supra (Excerpts reproduced in Portfolio for Peace, 1970, at 13).
139 See U Thant, supra note 100, at 183.
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ship, U Thant remarked that it was "the most challenging political
job on earth," although not "the most impossible job in the
world."'140 He described the challenging nature of the Office in the
following terms:
The United Nations, lacking any attributes of sovereignty, must
work by persuasion, argument, negotiation and a persistent search
for consensus. For all the high ideals in the Charter, it is a very
down-to-earth and pragmatic organization, which for the most part
deals with hard political realities rather than with sweet reason or
ideal aspirations. . . .The Secretary-General must usually operate
within these highly realistic limits if he is to achieve any useful re-
sults at all .... He is, and must be, at the same time a realist and a
man of idealism and hope .... 141
While it is debatable whether the Secretary-General is - or
should try to be - the conscience of mankind, he must certainly
never lose a strong personal sense of justice, of humanity, and of
the importance of human dignity.
The other quality which a Secretary-General can never afford to
lose is an urgent sense of political realism. The Secretary-General
operates under the Charter in a world of independent sovereign
States, where national interests remain dominant ....
These are the two poles of the Secretary-General's world - at
one extreme the idealism and the global objectives of the Charter;
at the other the pragmatic, and on occasion downright selfish, na-
ture of national sovereignty. Working between these two poles,
the Secretary-General cannot afford to lose touch with either ...
While he has a general obligation to act in accordance with the
principles of the Charter, to act effectively he must also work with
and through sovereign Governments .... National sovereignty and
national interest, humanitarian considerations, governmental suscep-
tibilities and the principles of the Charter form the elements of
an insoluble equation, which nonetheless the Secretary-General must
continually, and in all sorts of situations, attempt to solve. 142
U Thant has held the view that when a specific mandate is given
to the Secretary-General by the Security Council or the General As-
sembly, he must necessarily act in accordance with the terms of that
mandate. Emphasizing this position, he stated:
I feel strongly that the Secretary-General, irrespective of his personal
views on any issue, is obliged to stand by every resolution or decision
of the main deliberative organs of the United Nations. . . .The
Secretary-General has no option whatsoever in this regard, what-
ever may be the temporary effect on his relations with individual
Member States. Nor can he seek an escape from a resolution of an
organ of the United Nations because it may appear to be unpracti-
cal or even unfair.14
3
140 Id. at 187.
141 Id. at 186-87.
142 Id. at 180-81.
143 Id. at 182.
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With regard to the extent of discretion when acting under a specific
mandate, U Thant has stated:
Some element of discretion may remain in interpreting such a man-
date, which is often laid down in the broadest terms, or in deal-
ing with unexpected situations which may subsequently arise, but
this discretion has to be exercised in the light of an honest and
impartial appreciation by the Secretary-General of what he considers
to be the wishes of the organ concerned.144
The limitations on the Secretary-General's power to take politi-
cal initiative have been set forth by U Thant as follows:
When the Secretary-General considers exercising a political role on
his own initiative, or at the request of the parties, he must neces-
sarily arrive at his decision taking into account specific legal limita-
tions, such as Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, and practical
limitations such as a determination whether action on his part would
be likely to produce useful results. The Secretary-General has no
means of enforcement, no economic power at his disposal . . . . If
a move by the Secretary-General were to give rise to the impression
that he was intervening in a matter essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of a Member State, or taking a particular side in a con-
flict, or that he was abandoning his impartiality, his usefulness
would be at an end, as any measure of success is in turn a measure
of the confidence which he enjoys with the Governments con-
cerned. 145
Despite the limitations of the Secretary-General's powers in po-
litical matters, the Secretary-Generalships of both Hammarskj6ld
and U Thant have demonstrated that Governments generally ap-
preciate the availability of an institution such as the Office of the
Secretary-General as a possible means of seeking a solution to par-
ticular international differences.146
U Thant has been a very influential diplomatic figure and highly
respected by observers. Although he may not be regarded as pos-
sessing the rather unusual diplomatic finesse of Hammarskj6ld, he
has been able to carry on all the different kinds of activity which
were originated by his predecessor. Hammarskj6ld was the bril-
liant and innovative Secretary-General whose activities significantly
144 See Report, supra note 121, at 121.
1451d.
It'is true that the Secretary-General's prerogatives include no right to interfere in the
domestic affairs of states. However, see U Thant's statement regarding the question of
human rights vis-a-vis the concept of the domestic jurisdiction of a Member State quoted
on pp. 70-71: "This is an area where the Secretary-General may be able to help, inspire
of the legal and practical limitations, by discreet exercise of his good offices." Also see
the reference to Lauterpacht's argument on page 48: "The matters referred to in Article
99 are not, by definition, essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."
14o Id.
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molded the expectations regarding the office that he held, and his
successor greatly benefited from his work. It was Hammarskjbld,
responding to the opportunities thrown up by world events follow-
ing his appointment, who gave effective political content to the Of-
fice of the Secretary-General. U Thant filled an office that his pre-
decessor's practice had enlarged.
It must, however, be appreciated that Hammarskj6ld died at a
time when his Office was facing serious setbacks because of Soviet
resistance to his later work in the Congo. Indeed, in late 1960 and
throughout 1961, the Office was in danger of destruction. The con-
tinued Soviet opposition to further development of the Office placed
Secretary-General U Thant in a difficult position.
U Thant supported Hammarskj6ld's concepts and tried to emu-
late his approach, but he formulated no theory of his own concern-
ing the structure and processes of the Office as did Hammarskj6ld.
While Hammarskj6ld's writings and statements were marked by
their intellectual complexity and doctrinal content, U Thant's Se-
cretary-Generalship was marked by an absence of abstract pronounce-
ments and a concentration on pragmatism.
As for the development of the political role of the Office, U
Thant's tenure of Secretary-Generalship has essentially been a period
of consolidation, rather than one of expansion beyond the point at
which Hammarskj6ld left it. He was able to consolidate some, if
not all, of the gains made by Hammarskj6ld. He maintained, if
not strengthened, an office that was in danger of destruction. And
that may be regarded as his greatest accomplishment. Cautious and
circumspect, Secretary-General U Thant succeeded in reducing enor-
mously the controversy over the Office of the Secretary-General. He
survived the Congo crisis with heightened prestige and a mandate to
continue as Secretary-General.
U Thant's political and diplomatic successes with regard to set-
tlement of particular conflicts include the ending of the Congo crisis,
the peaceful settlement of the Cuban missile crisis, the transfer of
West New Guinea (West Irian) to Indonesia without extensive
conflict, his role of arbitrator in the Malaysian Federation issue, and
the settlement of the Bahrain question. These successful efforts are,
however, overshadowed by continuing problems such as those of the
Middle-East, Kashmir, Cyprus, apartheid in South Africa, Namibia,
and the Vietnam conflict.
It was important that U Thant had been able to maintain good
relationships with both the United States and the Soviet Union, but
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his trump card was Afro-Asian backing. As already noted,' 47 the
emergence of a large number of new independent states in Asia and
Africa resulted in a shift in the balance of influence in the United
Nations. U Thant was a perfect reflection of the new forces that
dominated the UN. As a spokesman for Afro-Asian interests, he
was able to build a "political constituency" upon which he relied
for support, particularly in situations where he could not please all
the great powers at the same time. He helped to move the Organi-
zation to a neutral posture in East-West conflicts. When UN ac-
tion suited the majority of the neutralist or non-aligned states, it was
difficult for either the Soviet Union or the United States to press a
strong attack. This development of a "political constituency" for
Secretary-General U Thant and his position as spokesman for the
Afro-Asian group of nations at the United Nations assisted him sub-
stantially. This was an advantage that the other Secretaries-General
did not have.
Conclusion
The development of the political role of the Secretary-General
raises questions affecting not only the future of the Secretariat but
also of the Organization itself. One consequence of this develop-
ment is that it places such a heavy demand on the Secretary-General's
time and energy that he may be forced to neglect other important
responsibilities resting upon him. Thus, U Thant had complained:
Article 97 establishes the Secretary-General as the Chief Admin-
istrative Officer of the Organization. This in itself is more than a
full-time job .... Like my predecessors, I have constantly had cause
to regret that other pressures leave the Secretary-General far too
little time for a task which in the long run will have a decisive
effect on the successful development and performance of the Orga-
nization.148
As the political role of the Secretary-General and his staff in-
creases, the demands for balanced geographical distribution within
the Secretariat are bound to be increasingly urgent and more diffi-
cult to resist. Member states "under-represented" in the Secretariat
would understandably insist that their nationals be appointed to
Secretariat posts in larger numbers and particularly to the more im-
portant political positions.
The emergence of the Secretary-General as an active diplomatic
147 See pp. 61-62.
148 See U Thant, supra note 100, at 181.
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agent has greatly improved the ability of the Security Council and
the General Assembly to influence conflicts along desired lines. It
has enabled them to dispense with unwieldy and often divided com-
mittees, which were seldom able to carry out mediatory functions
effectively, and to entrust such function to a single skillful diplomat,
the Secretary-General or his personal representative, who has often
been able to negotiate settlements of disputes more effectively. As
Hammarskjbld stated:
The main significance of the evolution of the Office of the Secre-
tary-General . . . lies in the fact that it has provided means for
smooth and fast action, which might otherwise not have been open
to the Organization. This is of special value in situations in which
prior public debate on a proposed course of action might increase
the difficulties that such an action would encounter, or in which a
vacuum might be feared because Members may prove hesitant, with-
out fuller knowledge of the facts or for other reasons, to give ex-
plicit prior support in detail to an action which, however, they ap-
prove in general terms or are willing should be tried without for-
mal commitment. 149
The recognition by member states that the person of the Secretary-
General provides an effective instrument of conciliation and that they
can privately seek his assistance whenever they need it has had the
effect of making the United Nations a more active center for the
resolution of international disputes.
The increased political role of the Secretary-General raises the
question of compatibility of such a role with the conception of an in-
dependent international civil servant. As already observed,"' Arti-
cles 98 and 99 of the Charter taken together open the door to the
problem of neutrality by giving the Secretary-General functions and
responsibilities that go beyond the administrative role described in
Article 97. This was the issue raised in the Soviet Union's criticism
against Hammarskj6ld and his Office for the manner in which he
conducted the UN Operation in the Congo. Premier Khrushchev
stated that "while there are neutral countries, there are no neutral
men."151
In a strong response to the Soviet challenge, Secretary-General
Hammarskj6ld stated in the General Assembly:
149 Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization for the year 1958-1959, 141 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.IA (A/4132/Add.1)
at 3.
150 See p. 43.
151 Cf. Dag Hammarskj6ld, The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact -
Oxford University lecture, May 30, 1961, at 3.
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... this is a question not of a man but of an institution. Use what-
ever words you like, independence, impartiality, objectivity - they
all describe essential aspects of what, without exception, must be
the attitude of the Secretary-General. . . . [Ilf the office of the
Secretary-General becomes a stumbling block for anyone, be it an
individual, a group or a government, because the incumbent stands
by the basic principle which must guide his whole activity, and if,
for that reason, he comes under criticism, such criticism strikes at
the very office and the concepts on which it is based. I would
rather see that office break on strict adherence to the principle of
independence, impartiality and objectivity than drift on the basis of
compromise . ... 152
Hammarskjbld made a distinction with regard to the notion of
neutrality:
If a demand for neutrality is made . . . with the intent that the
international civil servant should not be permitted to take a stand
on political issues, in response to requests of the General Assembly
or the Security Council, then the demand is in conflict with the
Charter itself. If, however, "neutrality" means that the interna-
tional civil servant, also in executive tasks with political implica-
tions, must remain wholly uninfluenced by national or group inter-
ests or ideologies, then the obligation to observe such neutrality is
• . . basic to the Charter concept of the international civil service.
153
Thus, while the Secretary-General has to be impartial in carrying
out his political duties, he cannot be neutral, if neutrality implies
political abstinence.
Elucidating further the notion of neutrality vis-A-vis the concept
of an international civil servant, Hammarskj5ld stated:
... the international civil servant cannot be accused of lack of neu-
trality simply for taking a stand on a controversial issue when this is
his duty and cannot be avoided .... If the international civil servant
knows himself to be free from . .. personal influences in his actions
and guided solely by the common aims and rules laid down for, and
by the Organization he serves and by recognised legal principles,
then he has done his duty, and then he can face the criticism which,
even so, will be unavoidable .... [A]t the final test, this is a ques-
tion of integrity, and if integrity in the sense of respect for law
and respect for truth were to drive him into positions of conflict
with this or that interest, then that conflict is a sign of his neutral-
ity - and not of his failure to observe neutrality - then it is in
line, not in conflict, with his duties as an international civil ser-
vant.15
4
In this respect Hammarskj6ld likened the role of the Secretary-Gen-
152 15 U.N. GAOR, 871st meeting, September 26, 1960, at 95.
153 See Hammarskj6ld, supra note 151, at 14.
154 Id. at 27.
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eral to that of a judge,'55 a comparison which, it has been ob-
served,1 56 is not altogether valid.
The development of the Secretary-General's political role has
given the Organization a certain nascent autonomy from its Mem-
bers. To the extent that the "constitutional" position of the Secre-
tary-General permits him to take a stand in the political questions
falling within the competence of the Organization, he represents
what has been called "the independent judgment of the Organiza-
tion." '157 With regard to this impact of the Secretary-General's po-
litical role on the United Nations, Hammarskjbld stated in 1959:
If the Secretary-General represents an independent but positive eval-
uation, free of partisan influences and determined by the purposes
of the Charter, this means not only that he reinforces the weight
that independent opinion may come to carry in the negotiations.
Step by step, he thereby also builds up a practice which may open
the door to a more generally recognised independent influence for
the Organization as such in the political evolution. 158
• .. [T~he wider functions which in specific cases have been
exercised by the Secretary-General fully maintain the character of
the United Nations as an organization whose activities are wholly
dependent on decisions of the Governments. On the other hand,
the development reflects an incipient growth of possibilities for the
Organization to operate in specific cases within a latitude of inde-
pendence in practice given to it by its Member Governments for
such cases. 1 9
One observer noted that in the late 1950's there emerged:
the growth of the notion of the United Nations not merely as a
center for the harmonization of conflicting interests but as an in-
ternational persona with authority over and above that accorded to
it by its Members
and he attributed this development both to the creation of the United
155Id.
156 See Goodrich, The Political Role of the Secretary-General, 16 INT'L ORGANIZA-
TION 733 (1962-63): "To liken the decision taken in such a situation to that of a
judge, as Hammarskjold did in his Oxford University address, is somewhat misleading,
as, first of all, the judge customarily has clearer guidance from written law and prece-
dents; and secondly, when he ventures into the realm of policy, he does so on the basis
of being part of a government with effective power, which is not the position of the
Secretary-General."
157 Dag Hammarskjbld, Do We Need the United Nations? - An Affirmative An-
swer (Copenhagen speech, May 2, 1959), in UNITED NATIONS REVIEW, June, 1959, at
25.
158Id. at 25-26.
159 See Report, supra note 149.
[Vol. 7: 36
HAMMARSKJOLD AND THANT
Nations Emergency Force and to "the growing stature in the public
as well as the official eye of Mr. Hammarskj6ld." 160
U Thant has also envisaged a growing role for the United Na-
tions with a developing stature as an independent force possessing a
will and interests of its own. He even went to the extent of de-
claring that:
the United Nations must ultimately develop in the same way as
sovereign States have done, and ... if it is to have a future, it must
eventually assume some of the attributes of a State. It must have
the right, the power and the means to keep the peace. We are only
in the beginning and the process will surely take several genera-
tions. But the peace-keeping operations already conducted .by the
United Nations provide the hope that we are on the road to these
essential developments. 16'
It has been said that ". . . the development of function alters the
content of law. ' 162 If the development of functions of the Secre-
tary-General has contributed to a growing autonomy for the United
Nations, the growing autonomy of the Organization is an indicator
of the process of political integration in the international system.
The traditional and still prevailing system of international law
was built around the concepts of national sovereignty and inde-
pendence. Understandably, national sovereignty continues to be a
jealously guarded possession. But the movement of states from in-
dependence to interdependence and greater integration poses the
question whether the concept of absolute sovereignty of a state has
not become rather outmoded and unrealistic. 6 '
160 Goodwin, The Political Role of the United Nations : Some British Views, 15
INT'L ORGANIZATION 591 (1961).
161 U Thant, The United Nations as a Force for Peace (Message sent by Secretary-
General U Thant to the people of Sweden when he was unable to keep a speaking en-
gagement there on May 1, 1963), in UNITED NATIONS REVIEW, May, 1963, at 39.
In this connection, it may be relevant to recall that in October 1958, speaking in
the General Debate of the General Assembly, Krishna Menon of India had raised "philo-
sophic" questions about the executive developmems of the previous few years: "It is all
very well in an emergency to produce some sort of machinery and say 'deliver the goods,'
but I think we must think hard and see that we do not get a situation where the United
Nations as at present composed, becomes a kind of superior authority, a kind of super-
state with its representatives directing governments, which is not provided for in the
Charter, and where the Secretary-General will be pushed away from his Charter func-
tions into other matters .... We have to see that we do not exceed the cautious balances
that have been introduced into this Charter for the preservation of national sovereignty
and for the preservation of small nations. If this rather superior power should be at the
disposal of a snap vote of a two-thirds majority, the position of small states and of mi-
norities would be far from enviable." 13 U.N. GAOR, General Debate, 774th Plenary
meeting, October 7, 1958, at 366.
162 Menon, The Modern State and International Law, 1 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 118
(1960-61).
163 For U Thant's views on national sovereignty, see U Thant, The League of Nations
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The growing interdependence of states necessarily accelerates
the further development of international law. Indeed, as U Thant
has observed, "there is already a fast-growing body of international
norms which is beginning to be referred to as the 'law of integra-
tion.' ""'
The concepts developed by Secretary-General Hammarskj6ld
and their practical application by him and his successor U Thant
constitute a challenge to those who deny the practical significance
of the legal process in an intensely political atmosphere such as that
of the United Nations. Their conceptions and practices affirmed the
importance of law in the United Nations while acknowledging the
reality of political power and pressures. Those precepts and prac-
tices bring fresh perspectives to the relation of law and politics in
contemporary international society. This is demonstrable by dis-
cerning their fundamental features:
Departing from the traditional positivist approach, Hammar-
skjdld viewed the body of law not merely as a technical set of rules
and procedures, but as the authoritative expression of principles that
determine the goals and direction of collective action. He recog-
nized that, in international society as in national sphere, legal norms
constitute one class of several factors that enter into the process of
decision-making, but he emphasized the binding character of the
legal element. Thus, he asserted:
Of primary importance . . .are the principles and purposes of the
Charter which are the fundamental law accepted by and binding on
all States. Necessarily general and comprehensive, these principles
and purposes still are specific enough to have practical significance
in concrete cases. 165
He viewed the purpose and principles embodied in the Charter:
as a projection into the international arena and the international
community of purposes and principles already accepted as being of
national validity. In this sense, the Charter takes a first step in the
direction of an organise.d international community .... 166
This was the premise on which Hammarskj6ld constructed his con-
and the United Nations - Address at the University of California, Berkeley, April 2,
1964, in UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE, May, 1964, at 72.
164 U Thant, International Law and the United Nations - Address at a meeting of
the International Bar Association in Dublin, Ireland, July 12, 1968, in UN MONTHLY
CHRONICLE, August-September, 1968, at 119.
165 See Hammarskj6ld, supra note 151, at 25.
166 Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization, 1960-1061, 16 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 1A (A/4800/Add.1), at 1.
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cepts and this was the guiding principle for his actions and those of
his successor.
The activities of the two Secretaries-General have clearly dem-
onstrated that legal norms can be applied to novel situations with-
out rigidity or blind conformity to precedent. Apart from their
ability to adopt an approach that was congenial to the interplay be-
tween principles and contingent fact, this is attributable to two fac-
tors. Firstly, while the exclusively international responsibility of
the Secretary-General required a firm adherence to the principles of
the Charter and other standards accepted as binding by member
states, the nature of those general rules permitted a flexible ap-
proach. They were mainly principles derived from Articles 1 and
2 of the Charter. They were flexible in that they did not impose
specific procedural patterns or detailed machinery for action, and
left room for adaptation to the particular needs and the resources
available for a given undertaking. Secondly, the problems that the
Secretaries-General had to deal with arose frequently in situations
of crisis. The element of crisis meant that there was strong pres-
sure to meet the necessities of the particular problem and at the same
time cautioned against a mechanical repetition of a formula that
might have unforeseen implications in future cases. In other words,
this second factor called for an ad hoc solution and a flexible appli-
cation of principles.
This flexible approach and the technique of fusing opposing ele-
ments into workable solutions should be of special interest to the in-
ternational lawyer. He is often confronted with problems involv-
ing basic principles in dialectical opposition. For instance, a prin-
ciple such as that of observance of human rights is balanced by the
concept of non-intervention in internal affairs; or, the notion of
equality of states has to be considered in a context which included
the special responsibilities of the Great Powers. The contradictory
implications of such principles make it obvious that they cannot
provide automatic answers to particular problems, but rather that
they serve as criteria which have to be weighed and balanced in
order to achieve a rational solution to the particular problem. 6 '
This is a task which requires, what Hammarskj6ld called, "that
167 Paul Freund has given eloquent expression to this idea in regard to the abstrac-
tions in American constitutional law: '"These abstractions, arrayed in intransigent hostil-
ity like robot sentinels facing each other across a border, can become useful guardians on
either hand in the climb to truth if they can be made to march together. Somehow the
life blood of the concrete problem tempers the mechanical arrogance of abstractions."
69 HARV. L. REV. 803 (1956).
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combination of steadfastness of purpose and flexibility of approach
which alone can guarantee that the possibilities which we are ex-
ploring will have been tested to the full.''168
As already noted,1"9 an important aspect of the enlargement of
the political role of the Secretary-General was the development of
new concepts 'such as the exercise of good offices, quiet diplomacy
and preventive diplomacy. Both Hammarskj6ld and U Thant con-
ceived of their Office primarily in terms of diplomacy. Their prac-
tices have demonstrated the oversimplification of the traditional view
of diplomacy as being separate from, or opposed to, the processes
of law. Their experience indicates that a properly balanced com-
bination of law and diplomacy is not only an advantage, but even a
necessity.
The advantage of a legal basis is quite evident in any concilia-
tion or good offices effort of the Secretary-General. His locus
standi as a third-party intermediary would be acceptable to the par-
ties directly concerned when it rests on firm legal authority. The
two Secretaries-General, therefore, attached considerable importance
to the legal authority enabling them to enter into private discussions
for the settlement of disputes."' 0
There is another aspect of the relation between law and diplo-
macy which the Secretaries-General could use with advantage in
their conciliation efforts. An essential element of the process of
establishing a common ground of principles to which both sides
could adhere was to suggest general standards which had a legal
quality, whether as an accepted norm of international law or as a
rule which was implied by or closely related to a principle of law.
The legal aspect could facilitate agreement between the parties con-
cerned. It would also offer an assurance of objectivity and impar-
tiality in carrying out the conciliation effort.
While Hammarskjdld's theories concerning his Office were based
on his belief in the imperative quality of legal norms, he had at the
same time a tough-minded awareness of the impact of power rela-
tions on the normative structure of international society. Indeed, as
108 Dag Hammarskjold, The Development of a Constitutional Framework for In-
ternational Cooperation - Address at the University of Chicago Law School, in UNITED
NATIONS REVIEW, June, 1960, at 30.
169 See pp. 52-56.
170 See pp. 52-54 and pp. 69-70. See also p. 57, where a reference has been made
to the "Peking Formula" devised by Hammarskj6ld in connection with his mission to
Peking to seek the release of U.S. airmen in Communist China.
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already noted,'71 at the time of his sudden and tragic death in Sep-
tember 1961, his Office was almost at the verge of being destroyed
on account of the Soviet resistance. And the continued Soviet oppo-
sition to further development of the Office of the Secretary-General
imposed severe restraint on his successor U Thant. Thus, although
both the Secretaries-General believed in the binding nature of legal
norms in international relations, that could not and did not mean
that they regarded law as an autonomous force which develops and
is applied independently of political and social factors. Hammar-
skj6ld viewed law not as a "construction of ideal patterns to be im-
posed upon society," but in an "organic sense, ' 172 as an institution
which grows in response to felt needs and within the limits set by
historical conditions and human attitudes. He did not attempt to
set law against power, but sought to find within the limits of power
the elements of common interest on the basis of which joint action
and agreed standards could be established. But it was characteristic
of him to regard the reality of power politics not merely as impos-
ing limits on the use of law, but in a positive sense as a challenge
which called for creative attempts to find new norms and proce-
dures "with faith in the ultimate result of the creative evolution in
which it is our privilege to cooperate."' 73
'71 See p. 74.
172 See Hammarskjo1d, supra note 168, at 27.
173 Id. at 30.
Also generally see Hammarskj6ld's address at the University of Chicago Law School
on The Development of a Constitutional Framework for International Cooperation, and
his answers to Press questions on that speech, in UNITED NATIONS REVIEW, June, 1960,
at 26-32.
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